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Chapter One – Introduction 
Introduction 
On November 4th, 2008, Barack Obama was elected on a mandate of change.  On 
issues of both domestic and foreign policy, Obama represented a significant 
transformation from the previous eight years of the second Bush presidency.  This change 
was well received by environmental advocates and non-governmental organizations 
devoted to environmental sustainability.  The day following the election, Sierra Club 
issued a statement proclaiming that the environmental future of the country is in “very 
capable hands” (Environmental News Service para. 2).  The same day, the president of 
Environmental Defense echoed this sentiment in a public statement stating: “this election 
offers us the greatest opportunity we have ever had to change course on global warming” 
(Environmental News Service para. 6).  Similarly, the Defenders of Wildlife Action 
publicly announced: 
For the first time in nearly a decade, we can look to the future with a sense of 
hope that the enormous environmental challenges we face will begin to be 
addressed and that our air, land, water, and wildlife -- and the overall health of our 
planet -- will not be sacrificed to appease polluting industries and campaign 
contributors. (Burkhalter para. 14) 
One month after the election, environmentalists excitedly professed that: “change really 
is here” (Jiwatram para. 1). Obama’s environmental appointments also signaled a radical 
diversion in the relationship between the presidency and the environment that promised 
to bring “science back in the forefront” of policy (Jiwatrama para. 12).  Not only was the 
mandate of environmental change permeating through the public imaginary, Obama 
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promised tangible policy approaches.  In his 2008 book, Obama stated that his 
environmental policy would “signal to the world the U.S. commitment to climate change 
leadership by implementing an aggressive domestic cap-and-trade program” (74). 
These strong expectations continued well into Obama’s presidency, demanding a 
rhetorical response.  From his address on clean energy development at Southern Illinois-
Carbondale’s first Agricultural Industry Day in April 2005, to his Oval Office address on 
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (BP oil spill) in June 2010, Obama has been a leading 
advocate for passing government regulations to prevent environmental devastation.  He 
has vocally supported several environmental policies, including a significant investment 
in clean energy and renewable technologies (“Clean Energy” para. 15), a cap on 
greenhouse gas emissions with an industrial trading scheme (“2010 State of the Union” 
para. 35), a clean-up effort in response to the BP oil spill (“Oil Spill” para. 7), and a 
substantial increase in regulation of the oil industry (“Oil Spill” para. 13).  His arguments 
in support of each policy have been carefully constructed to motivate public and 
congressional environmentalism (Mufson and Eilperin para. 3).   
The following thesis is a rhetorical examination of President Barack Obama’s 
environmental rhetoric during his first seventeen months in office.  This chapter will 
advance four sections.  First, I discuss the practical justifications for studying Obama’s 
presidential environmental rhetoric.  Next, I provide examples of prior research that will 
guide the investigation of this set of presidential addresses.  Next, I describe the 
methodology used to examine the possible implications of Obama’s rhetorical choices.  
Finally, I provide the layout of the following chapters. 
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Justification for Study 
Obama’s presidential campaign excited environmentalists.  However, this 
excitement created high expectations for Obama to follow through on campaign pledges.  
Environmentalists were anxious to see the change the president had promised reach 
fruition in policy changes.  As president, Obama faced challenges wading through the 
exigencies of political constituencies, public opinion, financial cost and other policy 
priorities.  When Obama was unable to respond to environmental exigencies with policy 
change, he often attempted to ameliorate concerns through public address.  Therefore, an 
evaluation of Obama’s rhetorical approach to environmentalism is a necessary 
component for understanding the interaction between environmental rhetoric and 
successful environmental policy.  
A major focus of Obama’s environmentalism was rhetorically constructing 
approaches that motivated the public to support liberal environmental policy.  There is no 
shortage of literature supporting the importance of presidential rhetoric in influencing 
public opinion towards legislative goals.  In 1908, Woodrow Wilson described that:   
The nation as a whole has chosen him [the president], and is conscious that it has 
no other political spokesman. His is the only national voice in affairs.  Let him 
once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force 
can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him.  His 
position takes the imagination of the country.  He is the representative of no 
constituency, but of the whole people.  When he speaks in his true character, he 
speaks for no special interest.  If he rightly interprets the national thought and 
boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of 
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action so much as when its President is of such insight and calibre.  Its instinct is 
for unified action, and it craves a single leader. (Prestritto 183) 
With the advent of widespread media access and globalization, one can only assume 
Wilson’s statements have increased in relevance throughout the last century. 
The president, both domestically and internationally, is the supreme example of a 
single representative voice.  And, while a presidential mandate may not be necessary to 
achieve legislative policy (for example, on widely popular issues), “when he decides to 
become involved, his influence can be decisive indeed” (Baumgartner and Jones 241).  
However, Cohen notes that this uniquely large influence is not determinative:  
Barriers to public receptivity also exist.  Politics is rarely an overriding or daily 
concern of most people…  The president also competes with other factors that 
influence the public’s thinking about politics and policy.  While other politicians 
might not be strong competitors in this regard, pre-existing attitudes, the mass 
media, and real-life experience may effectively compete with the president for 
influence over public opinion.  For example, those with pre-existing attitudes may 
be hard to budge, while those without pre-existing attitudes may be disinterested 
in politics.  Consequently, both may be immune from the president’s message, 
requiring extra presidential effort. (88) 
Given that presidential rhetoric is salient, but does not wholly determine the response of 
the public, it is important to uncover the possible influence of differing rhetorical choices 
and arguments.  
While there certainly are limits on the power of the presidential bully pulpit, it is 
difficult to deny the significant importance of a president’s rhetorical support for 
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legislative agenda items. Lawrence found that those test subjects that were exposed to a 
presidential “speech were approximately 4.6 times more likely to identify an issue 
mentioned in the speech as the most important problem than respondents who did not 
watch the speech” (16).  President Obama is case-in-point for highlighting the influence 
of political rhetoric; Obama, with his keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention, went from a relatively unknown Illinois State Senator to a potential 
presidential candidate in less than twenty minutes (Rowland and Jones 433). 
Obama’s rhetorical choices may provide insight into the lack of public support for 
environmental protection and regulation and provide possible guidance towards 
rectifying this concern.  Substantial public support may be the only way to overcome the 
political constituencies that oppose liberal regulation: 
Public opinion polls, too, speak for the American public. If public opinion had 
once been an amalgam of public correspondence, politicians' conversations, letter-
writing campaigns, petitions, and public demonstrations, this has not been the 
case for more than a half century…politicians, government officials, and the 
public pay attention to public opinion reflected in polling data. While public 
opinion may not ultimately settle issues, it almost always factors in decision 
making, as accounts of the operations of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations indicate. And if public opinion is especially one sided, it may 
actually be controlling. (Sparrow 579) 
The defeatist perception of the liberal public sphere as terminally stagnant is incorrect; 
change certainly can occur.  The challenge is motivating the public to embrace attitudes 
and actions that improve environmental sustainability in an era of rampant consumerism 
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(Rowland 214).  Since presidents often offer a guiding role for moving public opinion, it 
is useful to see what worked and failed for Obama. 
There is deep ideological polarization on the issue of how the government should 
respond to environmental problems.  Not only is there a political divide about the role of 
government in protecting the environment, there is also a clear lack of consensus as to 
whether there is an environmental problem at all – especially in the case of global 
warming.  Despite Obama’s best efforts, the wider public fails to recognize that 
ideological shifts made within the environmental movement today, and subsequent 
developments of environmental policy, will implicate humanity well into the future.   In a 
post-election 2008 poll, Washington Post-ABC pollsters asked 1,003 respondents: “What 
would you say is the one important problem you would like to see Obama and Congress 
deal with next year” (Washington Post, q. 7)?  Fewer then one percent responded 
“environment,” and even fewer responded “global warming.  These results were 
consistent with polling done in December of 2006 and 2005.  An overwhelming majority 
wanted economic prosperity, a policy shift in the war in Iraq, unemployment legislation 
or a new health care policy (Washington Post q. 7). 
This divide is troubling; because, on the issue of global warming, the science 
could not be more clear: “of 928 peer-reviewed articles in scientific journals randomly 
selected from the thousands that have been published in the last decade, not one 
questioned the fundamental conclusions” that global warming is real, human induced and 
an environmental concern (Hendricks and Inslee 7).  Despite this scientific consensus, 
Gallup Polling reveals:  
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[P]olitically polarized opinions, resulting in two Americas divided along 
ideological lines. Over the past decade, an increasing majority of Republicans 
question the validity of climate science and dismiss the urgency of the problem, 
while an increasing majority of Democrats accept climate science and express 
concern about the issue. (Nisbet 14) 
Analyzing Obama’s environmental arguments illuminates what can potentially motivate a 
public to support environmental regulation and protection:   
[I]nstitutions and professional groups share the uncontroversial goal of calling 
attention to climate change as a pressing problem while empowering citizens to 
become involved in national and local decisionmaking.  Yet despite these unified 
objectives, public engagement with climate change is still missing. If major policy 
change is to be achieved, new meanings and messengers for climate change are 
needed.  Communication can no longer remain a guessing game. (Nisbet 22) 
Motivating environmental responsibility is difficult because it’s nearly impossible to 
personalize the impact of a collapsing environment to individuals.  Similarly, 
environmental catastrophes are perceived as long-term problems of such a large 
magnitude that individual changes are rationalized as insufficient and unnecessary.  
Therefore, it is understandable that politicians are searching for the most motivational 
environmental arguments (Nisbet 22). 
 To this end, Obama participated in at least two strategy sessions with “a cross 
section of experts” to determine the best frame for his environmental policy (Mufson and 
Eilperin para. 2).  In July 2008, Obama listened to his advisors to best determine “how he 
could sell a low-carbon future of the American public” and to make his environmental 
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policy “pop more” for the public (Mufson and Eilperin para. 4, 5). At this time, campaign 
strategists argue, Obama turned from moral suasion to a pragmatic frame of national and 
economic security.  This framing choice is not haphazard or off-the-cuff; rather, it’s the 
result of strategizing with top environment and economic officials. 
There is practical significance to studying Obama’s presidential environmental 
rhetoric.  The importance of this area of study is magnified because environmental 
communication is an area of contemporary public address scholarship in which “insights 
can be translated back to the practical, problem-oriented contexts where political 
deliberations transpire” (Peterson 9).  Significantly, presidential environmental 
communication may provide the foreground for a “convincing demonstration of practical 
utility” (Peterson 9).  The state of the environment is in quick decline from global 
warming, pollution, species loss, desertification and land degradation.  Environmental 
decline has the propensity to negatively influence all of humanity, no matter 
socioeconomic status nor geographic location.  Moreover, environmental decline requires 
global cooperation and response; however, in order for this to occur the United States 
must show leadership by enacting policies that promote environmental sustainability.  
Given that presidential rhetorical choices influence the perception of both environmental 
decline and government response, determining the rhetorical choices most likely to 
motivate environmentalism is a worthy cause.  
Prior Research 
 A plethora of prominent scholars across a wide variety of disciplines provide a 
theoretical foundation for analyzing Obama’s presidential environmental rhetoric.  
Rhetorical scholars have begun the investigation into Obama’s presidency; however, the 
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vast majority of current works focus on Obama’s campaign strategies and pre-
presidential addresses.  Rowland and Jones evaluate the rhetorical strategies of the 
keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention (425).  Kephart and 
Rafferty evaluate questions of agency in Obama’s campaign rhetoric (6).  Simonson 
documents the primary campaign strategies of Obama and Clinton in South Texas (94).  
The majority of rhetorical scholarship found in journals devoted to rhetorical criticism 
focus on the issue of race or equality in Obama’s senatorial rhetoric; while, very few 
evaluate Obama’s rhetorical environmentalism as president.  
Despite the limited criticism of Obama’s environmental rhetoric, there is a vast 
array of scholarship devoted to understanding environmental rhetoric of previous 
administrations. Peterson edited a volume of case studies examining presidential 
environmental rhetoric in Green talk in the White House.  This text traces environmental 
rhetoric from Theodore Roosevelt through the beginning of the second Bush 
administration.  The template used in each chapter is to provide a layout of rhetorical 
strategies used by presidents to support environmentalism, determine how those 
strategies helped shape policy outcomes and provide evaluative statements about the 
most and least effective of the rhetorical choices.  Peterson outlines that the goal for 
environmental scholars is to stress communicative exchanges as foundational to 
understanding environmental policy (10).  Environmental presidential rhetoric 
scholarship creates the potential for cross-fertilization with methods and theories 
developed by public sphere scholars (Peterson 13).  In this way, public deliberation and 
presidential advocacy may in some ways provide insight to public policy, and scholarship 
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devoted to these texts “speak to the intellectual pursuit of a richer public sphere” 
(Peterson 14).  
Environmental communication scholarship, not focused on presidential 
environmentalism, provides insight as well.  Previous seminal texts include: Myerson and 
Rydin’s The language of environment: A new rhetoric; Killingsworth and Palmer’s 
Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America; Waddell’s Landmark Essays 
on Rhetoric and the Environment.  In Conserving Words, Philippon highlights the 
importance of rhetorical choice in framing the environmental movement.  Specifically, 
Philippon notes the importance of metaphor in establishing “presence” in language for a 
situated audience (14, 17).  Although Phillipon is discussing the relevance of choices 
made by speech-writers for representatives of the environmental movement, there is clear 
applicability to presidential environmental rhetoric.  Nisbet describes the many strategies 
which have been deployed to motivate the public to support environmental regulation: 
morality and ethics, religion, human rights, economic development, national security 
potential, apocalypse and public health (21-22).   Nisbet argues that environmental policy 
will deeply influence the bedrock of democratic liberalism; and, “[t]hese decisions are 
therefore too significant to leave to just elected officials and experts’ citizens need to be 
actively involved” (14).   Rhetorical construction of environmentalism is important for 
understanding citizen involvement because: “[f]raming a policy problem or issue endows 
certain dimensions of the complex issue with greater apparent relevance than they would 
have under an alternative frame” (Nisbet 17).   
 The following chapters draw from a permutation of the three areas of rhetorical 
criticism discussed above: Obama’s rhetorical strategies, historical presidential 
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environmentalism and environmental communication.  In doing so, I apply a rich 
academic foundation that is dedicated to determining the influence presidential 
environmental rhetoric has on achieving policy success.   
Methodology 
The texts evaluated in the following chapters are limited to Obama’s addresses as 
president, presented to an immediate domestic audience.  There are several reasons for 
choosing these boundaries.  First, while it would be insightful to study all of Obama’s 
rhetoric, the magnitude of that project is beyond my capabilities; therefore, some limiting 
choices must be made.  Second, limiting analysis to presidential environmental rhetoric 
helps explain the influence of the presidential bully pulpit, as opposed to environmental 
advocacy in general.  For example, my analysis excludes other environmental advocates 
like Al Gore, Bono and Bill Gates. In doing so, the template developed by Peterson in 
Green Talk for Roosevelt through the second Bush administration is extended to the 
Obama administration.  Third, I limit texts to Obama’s rhetoric presented to an 
immediate domestic audience because I am interested in how Obama frames his 
environmental advocacy to motivate the domestic audience to support his political 
agenda.  I assume that the framing strategies focused towards an international audience 
will be different, simply, because audience expectations are divergent (Brummans et al. 
28).  I am less interested, for the purpose of this study, about Obama’s addresses at 
international venues attempting to motivate an international audience to support 
environmental protection – largely because domestic regulation is a pre-requisite to 
action by the global community (Brown 239). 
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To determine which addresses “count” as Obama’s environmental rhetoric, I 
utilize a Washington Post database that categorizes Obama’s addresses based on issues of 
concern.  For example, there are separate sections devoted to: education, health care, 
homeland security, social issues, energy and environment, etc.  Some speeches, such as 
the State of the Union addresses can be found in nearly all categories.  Between Obama’s 
inauguration and July 15th 2010, there were forty speeches in the “energy and 
environment” issue category; therefore, these forty speeches were the set that I used to 
parse out Obama’s rhetorical strategies and justifications for his environmental and 
energy agenda. 
 For a method of criticism, I use an open-ended search for environmental 
arguments and justifications within these texts.  I locate the components of Obama’s 
speeches where he advocates changes in environmental policy or describes the 
inadequacies of the status quo approach to the environment.  To do this, I use key term 
searches for pivotal terms: environment, global warming, climate change, species, 
biodiversity, energy and oil.  I map the themes and topoi that emerge from the text and 
attempt to discern Obama’s strategy.  In doing this, my goal is to use “every instrument” 
available, and allow the text to disclose itself emically (E. Black xii).  Thus, I impose no 
theory that does not emerge from the “rhetorical transaction itself” (E. Black 332).  In the 
analysis section of the fourth chapter, I draw upon strands of methods from: metaphoric 
criticism, social scientific response polling, critical analysis, Burkean criticism and 
several other rhetorical approaches. 
 After determining which arguments Obama preferences in arguing for 
environmental policy, I analyze how those choices may influence outcomes in both 
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public opinion and policy change.  Three rhetorical scholars provide the theoretical 
foreground for this evaluation: Bitzer, Zarefsky and Burke.  Bitzer’s discussion of 
rhetorical exigence helps explain why Obama’s environmental rhetoric does not match 
the exact desires of environmental advocates.  While environmentalists are wholly 
concerned with the exigence of environmental decline, Obama is forced to respond to 
several distinct exigences: other domestic priorities, economic decline, political 
constituencies, etc.  This helps explain the frustration of environmental advocates and 
non-governmental organizations with Obama for not pursuing an environmental agenda 
directly in tune with the desires of these environmental groups.  
 Zarefsky’s keynote address “Definitions” at Alta provides a theoretical foundation 
for determining how specific rhetorical justifications function for an audience.   Using 
one justification for environmental policy dissociates, for the audience, other possible 
rhetorical justifications.  For example, an argument for the economic benefits of green 
energy is not purely additive; instead, it deflects alternate arguments or justifications for 
similar environmental and energy policies.  Thus, using one definition of a situation 
inherently excludes possible alternative explanations.  Burke describes this rhetorical 
transaction as both a “selection and a deflection of reality” (45).  In the case of Obama, 
using non-environmental justifications for environmental policy dissociates 
environmental justifications and sidesteps the environmental debate entirely.  By 
justifying environmental policies with non-environmental arguments, environmental 
impacts are sidelined and the impact of the policy on the environment itself becomes a 
secondary concern.  Obama’s political strategy is clear: given the overwhelming public 
antipathy because of the sluggish economy, the economic and national security frames 
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may be able to motivate individuals who would otherwise be apathetic towards 
environmental policy.  However, is there a cost to this strategy?  Are there unforeseen 
consequences of privileging the economic and national security arguments, while 
explicitly disregarding scientific consensus over climate change?  The following chapters 
will address these questions. 
Subsequent Chapters 
 The rhetorical examination of Obama’s environmental advocacy will proceed 
through three subsequent chapters.  Chapter two provides a historical discussion of 
presidential environmental rhetoric, with a principled focus on FDR through the second 
Bush administration.  Chapter three describes the rhetorical strategies used by Obama in 
public addresses, and determines the most oft-used environmental justifications 
throughout the first seventeen months of the Obama presidency.  The final chapter 
rhetorically evaluates Obama’s messages in an effort to build a theory for understanding 
pragmatic presidential environmental rhetoric.  The final chapter will also advance 
possible implications of this study and discuss future areas of research. 
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Chapter Two – History of Presidential Environmental Rhetoric 
Introduction 
The United States has seen over a century of presidential rhetoric devoted to 
environmental causes.  There has been substantial diversity among the approaches taken 
by different presidents, yet consistent themes and approaches emerge.  To determine the 
possible effects of Obama’s justifications for his environmental policy, it is helpful to 
look at historical successes and failures of presidential environmental rhetoric.   
While Teddy Roosevelt is remembered as the Great Conservationist, “most of 
contemporary U.S. environmental policy is grounded in the political structure developed 
by Franklin Roosevelt (who is not strongly identified with the environmental movement 
in the popular imagination)” (Peterson 18).  Franklin Roosevelt, Teddy’s distant cousin, 
was the first to use the integration of “environmental issues into the political, scientific, 
social and economic challenges facing his administration” (Peterson 18).  Thus, Franklin 
Roosevelt was the first president to dedicate himself to several thoughtful and distinct 
rhetorical strategies to motivate environmentalism, instead of relying on appeals to 
morality as the primary rhetorical strategy.  Moreover, the depression era “witnessed the 
rise of environmental consciousness”; therefore, a focus specifically on post-depression 
era interaction between presidential environmental rhetoric and politically successes is 
pertinent (Conan 3).  Separating Franklin Roosevelt from the environmentalism of his 
distant cousin is helpful in understanding the foundation of American environmentalism: 
If one attempts to look at young FDR apart from these other, more traditional 
environmentalist, he finds that FDR’s strong commitment to the natural 
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environment fueled an ethic much more complex and applied than that of his 
famous conservation-minded cousin. (B. Black 22) 
Therefore, I use Franklin Roosevelt’s presidential terms as the earliest period for 
evaluating the ability of presidential environmental rhetoric to produce effective 
regulatory policy, and chronologically describe rhetorical strategies used from FDR to the 
second Bush administration.   
From FDR to the Second Bush Administration 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s environmentalism was both motivated and limited 
by a plethora of political, economic and institutional concerns.  While Roosevelt was a 
self-proclaimed environmentalist, he was also an “astute student of American politics”; 
therefore, he understood that political lobbies and constituencies as well as public opinion 
had the potential to limit his environmental policy (Daughton and Beasley 86).  Similarly, 
the economic crisis and turbulent international arena during the 1930’s constrained 
Roosevelt’s reign over environmental policy: 
When FDR assumed office in 1933, the country was reeling from the economic 
devastation of the Great Depression…By 1940 the American people were 
increasingly turning their attention to the mounting hostilities abroad; by 1942 
citizens were probably more interested in conserving their food rations than 
anything else. (Daughton and Beasley 88) 
Despite these constraints, Roosevelt kept environmentalism at the top of his concerns, 
arguing to Congress that: “conservation of our national resources must necessarily be one 
of the primary responsibilities of the Federal Government at all times” (Roosevelt 
“Progress Report”).  Roosevelt chose his rhetorical justifications very carefully: “instead 
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of talking about the need to preserve or even appreciate nature for its own sake, 
Roosevelt repeatedly argued that conservation made good economic sense for the United 
States” (Daughton and Beasley 87).  In a study of Roosevelt’s environmental rhetoric, 
historians found that nearly 80 percent of his environmental justifications contained 
“economic appeals for the conservation of all resources” as a “major focus” of his 
arguments (Daughton and Beasley 93).  Rhetorically, his programs were portrayed as 
efficient job creators, while justifications that highlighted the environmental benefits of 
his policies were either secondary or non-existent. 
 Political cartoonist Jay Norwood Darling was a leading critic of Roosevelt’s 
environmental policy.  While Roosevelt surely chose politically expedient and pragmatic 
justifications for his environmental policy, Darling depicted Roosevelt’s economic 
justifications for his environmental policy as born out of “political compromise” and 
“middle course” that would not lay the groundwork for a truly environmentally 
sustainable society (Daughton and Beasley 87). Darling worried that Roosevelt’s 
environmental policy was not founded on a desire for long-term or sustainable support; 
rather, that it was based on “political zeitgeist” that would waver once popular opinion 
became focused on another issue (Daughton and Beasley 100). 
 An illustration of the limitations of Roosevelt’s economic justifications for 
environmental policy can be found in the debate between Darling and Roosevelt over the 
Hoover dam: 
While justifying environmental action almost solely in terms of economic gain, 
for example, Roosevelt said very little about why the natural world might be 
valuable for other reasons (or even in its own right)…this is exactly the charge 
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Darling leveled repeatedly at Roosevelt and his secretary of the interior Harold 
Ickes.  Building a dam might put people back to work and provide an additional 
power source, but it was also apparent to scientists and conservations even of 
Roosevelt’s era that such construction would do irreparable damage to the local 
ecosystem” (Daughton and Beasley 106). 
This example repeats itself throughout history as economic justifications for 
environmental policy produce a compromised short-term success, but fail to garner 
widespread public or congressional support for sustainable environmentalism (Leslie 4). 
 Roosevelt integrated a secondary justification for environmental policy based on 
national security.  He appealed to civil unity and national security by referring to his 
conservation policy as a “great battle” to save the forests and protect the environment 
(Daughton and Beasley 92).  This limited integration of the military metaphor, while 
difficult to tie explicitly to a change in public understanding is an important foundation 
for the depiction of military metaphor in both environmental and social policy throughout 
the next seventy years. 
 Harry Truman, after serving as vice president to Roosevelt, shared many of the 
“same values that FDR advocated” (Daynes and Sussman, “White House Politics” 36).  
He supported environmental protection and pressured Congress on multiple occasions to 
enact environmental legislation.  However, his justifications were not based on 
environmental values, but instead: “he realized that conserving resources was the key to 
ensuring a viable economy and a strong position for America abroad” (Daynes and 
Sussman “White House Politics” 36).  By using economic and national security 
justifications for environmental policy, environmentalism for the sake of the environment 
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was sidelined.  In fact, this negotiated and compromised approach wasn’t intended to 
protect the environment at all.  Instead, Truman argued in a 1951 address to Congress 
that conservation was only valuable insofar as it allowed the conserved resources to be 
exploited for industrial strength and military prowess: 
With these purposes in mind, we must apportion materials and manpower 
carefully among military needs, stockpiling, and industrial needs. We must divide 
industrial supply carefully, so as to expand in some areas while contracting its 
others. We must divide total civilian supply carefully between industry and 
consumers, so that we do not weaken manpower while improving tools.  The 
handling of our natural resources is a vital aspect of this problem. Many projects 
must be cancelled or deferred, but those necessary for defense and essential 
civilian needs must go forward... If we do not expand the use of some of these 
resources, for example, through carefully selected power developments, we 
cannot expect to reach the full potential of our industrial strength. We can cut 
down enough on the private and public use of materials and manpower for 
nonessentials to accomplish these essential projects.  Our human resources are our 
main economic strength. When we finally win in the contest between freedom and 
slavery, it will not be primarily because of our superior technology. (35-36) 
Truman’s choice to frame his conservation policy in terms of economics and industrial 
strength significantly limited his ability to achieve effective resource conservation and 
environmental regulation.  The value placed on the environment was primarily for human 
consumption and use, not the environment itself.  In a time of economic and military 
crisis, environmental policy became expendable because it was not based on 
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environmentalism for the sake of the environment.  Thus, when distracted by 
international or domestic economic concerns, compromise and negotiation was required 
and came directly at the expense of the environment. 
 Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican following two Democratic administrations, 
preferred a much more conservative approach to both domestic policy and 
environmentalism (Lammers and Genovese 173).  Eisenhower was principally interested 
in foreign policy and was less concerned with expending political capital on domestic 
environmental reform.  His small government approach substantially constrained 
environmentalism during his administration:  
[W]hile he would suggest the need to conserve limited resources, he made it quite 
clear that he was more seriously concerned with maintaining fiscal responsibility 
at the federal level rather than ensuring environmental quality. (Daynes and 
Sussman “White House Politics” 124) 
Even when his environmental policy achieved success, Eisenhower avoided publicizing 
these accomplishments.  While he did preside over legislation that limited air and water 
pollution, “environmentalism in the 1950s could be considered an issue that was not a 
primary concern of Eisenhower” (Daynes and Sussman “White House Politics” 138).   
 John F. Kennedy, voted one of the ten greenest presidents in American history, 
was elected in 1960 by an extremely narrow margin (The Daily Green para. 1).  He 
campaigned on a platform to “get the country moving again.”  His rhetorical approach to 
environmental policy offered contrast from the presidents before him.  Instead of 
emphasizing mostly economic or national security justifications for his environmental 
policy, he noted the intrinsic value of the natural world: 
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Our primary task is to increase our understanding of our natural environment to 
the point where we can enjoy it without defacing it, use its bounty without 
permanently detracting from its value and, above all, maintain a living evolving 
balance between man’s actions and nature’s reaction. For the nation’s great 
natural resource base is as elastic and as productive as our ingenuity and skills. 
(Kennedy “University of Wyoming”)  
What distinguishes this approach from the rhetoric that precedes it is the emphasis on the 
limits to consumption.  Unlike Truman’s approach, which only saved resources for future 
consumption, Kennedy noted the necessity of preservation of resources for achieving a 
balance between humanity and nature. 
 Kennedy surely purported balance at times; however, his justifications modeled 
historical environmental arguments in some ways as well.  Similar to Truman’s emphasis 
on military and industrial strength, Kennedy argued that:  
Today this great gift of material wealth provides the foundation upon which the 
defense of freedom rests, here and around the world.  And our future greatness 
and our strength depend upon the continued abundant use of our natural 
resources. (Kennedy “Dedication”) 
In this way, Kennedy embraced policies founded on an exceptionalist vision of the 
United States. 
While his rhetorical choices varied, his commitment to conservation and 
environmental sustainability did not.  With Kennedy’s “strong endorsement,” the Clean 
Air Act of 1963 passed Congress (Daynes and Sussman “White House Politics” 51).  
Kennedy also issued nineteen executive orders devoted to environmental protection. 
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Coinciding with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, which is credited with 
starting the modern environmental movement, Kennedy’s presidency witnessed the 
advent of public excitement for environmental sustainability. 
Johnson, following Kennedy’s assassination, continued Kennedy’s tradition of 
justifying environmental policy with a thematic permutation of American exceptionalism 
and intrinsic beauty.  During this time, concerns for the environment were bipartisan and 
action to prevent continued environmental decline was publicly popular (Daynes and 
Sussman “White House Politics” 57).  The first dedication to environmental questions for 
public polling occurred during the Johnson administration.  A Gallup poll reveals that the 
percentage of people who thought “reducing pollution of air and water” was one of the 
three national problems that should receive government attention dramatically increased 
from 17 to 53 between 1965 and 1970 (Dunlap 93).  The number of people who viewed 
air pollution as a serious problem doubled between 1965 and 1968 (Dunlap 93).  And, the 
number of people who viewed water pollution as a “very or somewhat serious” threat 
doubled between 1965-1970 (Dunlap 93).  While it is difficult to tie changing public 
opinion directly to rhetorical choices of both Kennedy and Johnson, the mix of both 
public pressure and their strategies produced a truly progressive environmental 
presidency.   
While Johnson is not widely remembered for environmental rhetoric that is 
distinct from Kennedy’s approach, his legacy lies with the formal declaration of the war 
on poverty: 
This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty 
in America…It will not be a short or easy struggle, no single weapon or strategy 
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will suffice, but we shall not rest until that war is won....But this attack, to be 
effective, must also be organized at the State and the local level....For the war 
against poverty will not be  won here in Washington. It must be won in the 
field, in every private home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the 
White House....[W]hatever the cause, our joint Federal-local effort must pursue 
poverty, pursue it wherever it exists (L.B. Johnson “1964 State of Union”). 
Subsequently, Johnson declared a war on crime, which was expanded during the Nixon 
and Reagan administrations (Elkins 3-4).  The implications of the choice to represent 
social policies through military metaphor are worthy of investigation, given the similar 
metaphoric justifications used by several presidents to justify environmental policy. 
Johnson’s war on poverty, while unsuccessful at alleviating poverty in the long-
term, was certainly not without its shining moments:   
This broader set of programs—including Medicare and Medicaid, the Civil Rights 
and Voting Rights Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and tuition 
subsidies for higher education—helped to reduce poverty in the United States. But 
the war on poverty failed to confront, and was unable or unwilling to take on, 
some of the deepest structural conditions that created and maintained poverty 
(Elkins 14). 
While poverty rates were significantly reduced, Johnson refused to take significant steps 
necessary to help overcome structural inequality.  Once the poverty rate declined, the 
government had “won the war” and chose to forgo broader changes to alleviate poverty 
(Devine and Wright 31). 
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Although the argument is often made that the war on poverty became victim to 
the Vietnam conflict, blaming the military conflict alone oversimplifies the nature of the 
problem (Zarefsky “President Johnson” xi).  Instead, “many of the difficulties plaguing 
the antipoverty effort not only were unrelated to the military escalation in Southeast Asia 
but actually preceded it” (Zarefsky “President Johnson” xi).  While there were certain 
tradeoffs between the Vietnam conflict and the war on poverty in terms of presidential 
political capital, White House focus, and governmental resources, the problem with the 
war on poverty resides more in discursive framing.  Rather, Johnson’s rhetorical choice 
permeated the public sphere to limit the success of the war on poverty as Americans were 
called to “enlist as volunteers in the war against poverty” (L.B. Johnson “Special 
Message to Congress”) and “weapons and tactics” were chosen by the government to 
defeat the (impoverished) enemy (Zarefsky “President Johnson” 31).  In this militarized 
environment, empirical statistical analysis became unfortunately irrelevant; “if Congress 
judged the program to be a success, then a success it was” (Zarefsky “President Johnson” 
79). 
Even worse, the militarized approach to poverty policy transitioned into a violent 
war on the poor.  The middle and upper class began to view those in poverty as enemy to 
the nation, which justified escalating violence in response to the militancy of the black 
poor (Elkins 18).  Rhetorical slippage occurred as, “[p]overty as an enemy of the nation 
had become the poor as an enemy of the nation” (Elkins 18).  Through enemyship, the 
government was able to dichotomize the body politic and stigmatize the lower class.  The 
government became so concerned with eradicating the condition of poverty that they lost 
sight of the negative implications that the war on poverty was creating. 
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Johnson also rhetorically depicted the governmental response to crime through 
military metaphor as a component of his “Great Society” (Simon “Governing Through 
Crime” 93).  Johnson’s war on crime denoted an enemy within our territory; one that 
must be eradicated at all costs.  Criminals, within this framework, were neatly separated 
as non-citizens, which justified violence and significant rights violations in response to 
crime: “crime [was] made to appear not as an individual act, at all, but as part of a 
collective invasion” (Elkins 23).  Not surprisingly, this otherization was 
disproportionately laid upon racial minorities:  
The unfortunate and unintended consequences of the war on crime, however, 
extend far beyond the criminal justice system itself.  Crackdowns on crime are 
directed at those populations considered to be most dangerous to society.  This 
implies that minority groups will be affected disproportionately by these efforts.  
As we have seen, this has been precisely the case for black Americans, many of 
whom quite understandably resent the differential treatment imposed on them by 
vigorous law enforcement efforts.  It should come as little surprise, therefore, that 
police-citizen confrontation involving minority group members are likely to be 
filled with tension and hostility, and can ignite episodes of collective disorder. 
(Crutchfield, Kubrin and Bridges 428) 
Thus, a vicious circle was created – anti-crime strategies were targeted at a subjugated 
class, which revolted violently, and then fell victim to even stricter legal penalty.     
This feedback continues today as poor communities lack strong family support 
because of incarceration techniques used during the war on crime: 
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The large-scale removal of young males from the general population depletes the 
supply  of potential marriage partners for young females.  In so doing, expansive 
incarceration policies impede the formation of traditional families and thereby 
encourage, indirectly,  higher rates of…family conditions that have been linked 
with high rates of crime.  Thus the war on crime has not only failed to realize the 
goal of significant crime reduction: it has exacerbated the very problems that it is 
supposed to solve…the war on crime is more than just a rhetorical device: it is a 
classic instance of the sociological self-fulfilling prophecy. (Crutchfield, Kubrin 
and Bridges 428) 
The militancy of the war on crime caused a backlash among the most at risk populations, 
failed to reduce crime and created unanticipated externalities that led to increased 
violence.   
Richard Nixon, the second Republican since Roosevelt, is perhaps the most 
enigmatic environmentalist president.  Some of the most important environmental 
legislation was signed under his tenure: the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Water 
Drinking Act, the legislation that established the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungide and Rodenticide Act, and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act.  However, this achievement is largely because of Congress’ liberal make-up 
during Nixon’s tenure, and happened despite Nixon’s relative ambivalence towards 
environmental sustainability.  Congress’ environmental record under Nixon’s tenure is 
unmatched; however, “it seems that the environment mattered only as a political issue to 
Nixon and mattered not much at all to his advisers” (Vickery 127).  
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Continuing with the pre-Kennedy tradition of presidential environmental rhetoric, 
Nixon’s environmental advocacy relied heavily on economic justifications.  Calls to 
“limit growth” were politically impossible; therefore, Nixon inoculated opponents of 
environmentalism by claiming that economic growth and environmental protection go 
hand-in-hand: 
Now, I realize that the argument is often made that there is a fundamental 
contradiction between economic growth and the quality of life, so that to have one 
we must forsake the other.  The answer is not to abandon growth but to redirect 
it…Continuous vigorous economic growth provides us with the means to enrich 
life itself. (Nixon “1970 State of the Union”) 
Given that the value of the environment, to Nixon, was economic and political then it 
became very difficult for Nixon to propose policies that limited economic growth.  
Therefore, Nixon’s policies were compromised and piecemeal.  He did not want to 
bankrupt society by imposing significant regulation; instead, he believed that having both 
unrestrained economic growth and a healthy environment was a priority.  Given this set 
of priorities and the overwhelming emphasis on economic growth, Nixon’s legacy is one 
of half-hearted environmentalism: 
Nixon established the EPA in a way that guaranteed no federal regulatory action 
regarding natural resource conservation and pollution control could be taken 
without being disciplined by the capitalist political economy.  This was the 
political elegance with which the ideals of ecological philosophy were co-opted 
by embedding them in the coordinating bureaucratic structure of the EPA. 
(Vickery 127) 
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Nixon’s economic justification became a constraint on environmental activists.  If it were 
true that unlimited consumption and rigorous economic growth were compatible with 
environmental protection, arguments in favor of protection and regulation were 
disregarded once it was understood that environmental policy might in some ways hurt 
the economy.  
 Nixon was president during the peak of the environmental movement.  Once 
Silent Spring was widely read, there was enormous public pressure for environmental 
regulation and protection.  From 1968-1970, “press coverage of the environment in the 
New York times quadrupled” (Cannon and Riehl 206).  In this way, Nixon’s 
environmentalism was much more a response to public pressure, than a motivator of 
public opinion: 
Presidential rhetoric defines a discourse of its own; it is also part of the larger 
national discourse that is part of - some might argue, is - our political life. Its 
dialogic, or interactive, qualities are pervasive, even when the form of the 
discourse is a presidential speech or statement. In preparing and delivering a 
speech, the president and his advisors have done their best to anticipate and shape 
the public's reactions, using the results of focus groups, polls, and their own 
political instincts and judgment. After the speech, the president's staff will assess 
those reactions for future planning. Thus, presidential rhetoric has the quality of 
both pushing and being pushed by the public's views. (Cannon and Riehl 201) 
Similarly, environmental progress made during Nixon’s tenure can be found in legislative 
gains made by a Democratic Congress, not because of Nixon’s rhetorical dedication to 
environmentalism. 
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Nixon was the first president to integrate oil independence into his rhetorical 
strategies.  Nixon began the enthymematic appeal to both economic and national security 
by arguing that United States’ dependence on Middle Eastern countries for oil would 
significantly hinder the ability of our country to function during conflict.  Nixon, 
presiding over the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil 
embargo of 1973, emphatically called to end dependence on oil: 
Just as 1970 was the year in which we began a full-scale effort to protect the 
environment, 1974 must be the year in which we organize a full-scale effort to 
provide for our energy needs, not only in this decade but through the 21st century.  
As we move toward the celebration 2 years from now of the 200th anniversary of 
this Nation's independence, let us press vigorously on toward the goal I 
announced last November for Project Independence. Let this be our national goal: 
At the end of this decade, in the year 1980, the United States will not be 
dependent on any other country for the energy we need to provide our jobs, to 
heat our homes, and to keep our transportation moving. (Nixon “1974 State of 
Union”) 
Nixon, largely apathetic to environmental concerns, justified his energy policy on 
national security grounds, not on “ecological values” (Vickery 123).  The appeal to 
national security happened enthymematically through references to oil dependence and 
energy security.  It was not necessary, in 1973, to belabor the disadvantages of oil 
dependence because the crisis made the average American feel held hostage to 
“economic blackmail” from foreign oil sources (Mieczkowski 224).  Thus, the statement 
“oil dependence” implied freedom, peace and military superiority.  Nixon placed the 
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argument for oil independence firmly into the public imagination; in fact, “[e]very 
President since Richard Nixon has decried our nation’s dependence on foreign oil, yet 
that dependence has climbed steadily for more than three decades” (Sandalow 12).  
In concert with this literal appeal to national security, Nixon followed in 
Roosevelt’s footsteps by integrating military metaphor into his rhetorical advocacy.  In 
his 1970 State of the Union, Nixon called for the public to “enlist in this fight” to sustain 
a hospitable planet (“1970 State of Union”).  Nixon understood the practical utility of this 
militarized metaphor by arguing for a “war on pollution” (Nixon “Reorganization Plan”).  
ABC News:  
“[R]ejoiced that there was ‘something good about pollution. In a time of stress 
and strife, it has at least united the country in opposition to it. . . . Republicans and 
Democrats, radicals and rightists, young and old, rich and poor, finally found a 
war all can support—a war on pollution.’ Environmentalism, according to these 
reports, promised to replace the polarizing protests of the time with a consensual 
cause that could bring the nation together. (Dunaway 68) 
In this way, a rallying cry was sent from the president, interpreted by the media, and 
displayed to the public.   
 Gerald Ford, remembered for his supply-side energy reform and his tenure as a 
National Park Ranger, supported conservation and protection of public lands.  Similar to 
previous presidents, economic justification was an a priori concern for Ford’s 
environmental reforms.  This rhetorical decision is exemplified in an address given 
eleven months into his presidency at the University of Cincinnati: 
33 
I cherish the out-of-doors, and I stand with those who fight to preserve what is 
best in our environment.  But as President, I can never lose sight of another 
insistent aspect of our environment -- the economic needs of the American 
people. Your security, your well-being must enter into every decision I make -- 
and it does.  I pursue the goal of clean air and pure water, but I must also pursue 
the objective of maximum jobs and continued economic progress. Unemployment 
is as real and as sickening a blight as any pollutant that threatens the Nation.  If 
accomplishing every worthy environmental objective would slow down our effort 
to regain energy independence and a stronger economy, then of necessity I must 
weigh all factors involved. My decision must reflect the needs of the future but 
also the demands of the present. (Ford “National Environmental Research 
Center”) 
Clearly, Ford recognized an inherent value in environmental protection; however, his 
approach required that any growth-limiting policy be discarded in favor of more limited 
environmental policy.  While Ford did achieve some success in his conservation efforts, 
both his lack of effort and his rhetorical frame of unrestrained economic growth limited 
any gains in the area of environmental regulation (Daynes and Sussman 154).  These 
forty years of presidential environmental rhetoric show an emerging historical theme: if 
environmental policy is justified mainly in terms of promoting economic growth, then 
regulation that is necessary to prevent real environmental harm is more difficult to 
achieve because of the possible tradeoffs with economic growth. 
 Jimmy Carter was elected, along with a Democratic Congress, after eight years of 
conservative environmentalism on a platform of environmental and energy policy 
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change.  During his tenure as Governor of Georgia, he publicly advocated environmental 
protection and achieved significant successes.  However, two constraints limited Carter’s 
ability to achieve environmental reform as president.  First, Carter followed historical 
precedent by emphasizing environmental policy that would not restrain the economy 
(Daynes and Sussman 87).  Moreover, the “tension between environmentalism and 
economic growth was cast in sharper terms since the country was suffering through a 
sustained period of stagflation” (Tatalovich and Wattier 155).  Therefore, any growth-
limiting regulation was already off the table.  Second, Carter suffered notorious failures 
in his ability to mobilize public opinion.  Carter, instead of lobbying Congress directly, 
campaigned through television and radio, which was not received well by legislators.  His 
disregard for direct interaction with Congress substantially hindered his environmental 
policy:  
Carter, unlike Nixon, did not use his power to propose legislation to Congress.  
Instead, he made public speeches, suggested measures he hoped Congress would 
consider and tried to put environmental concerns on the public agenda through 
general speeches. (Hunter and Noonan 317) 
Carter, instead of supporting specific proposals through horse-trading and expenditure of 
political capital, provided sweeping comprehensive legislation to Congress without 
consultation or presidential leadership (Daynes and Sussman 90).  His failure to consult 
and cooperate with Congress over his environmental policy resulted in much of his 
legislation never getting out of committee (Daynes and Sussman 90).  Therefore, Carter’s 
inattention to the intricacies of environmental policy symbolized a failure of the president 
to motivate via the bully pulpit. 
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Carter, four months before the second oil crisis caused by strikes at Iran’s national 
oil refineries, gave an impassioned address formally titled the “Crisis of Confidence” 
speech – often referenced as the “malaise” speech.  In this address, Carter argued that the 
oil crisis was the “moral equivalent of war” and he promised an end to the growth in 
foreign oil dependence: 
This intolerable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic independence 
and the very security of our Nation.  The energy crisis is real.  It is worldwide.  It 
is a clear and present danger to our Nation.  These are facts and we simply must 
face them…Beginning this moment, this Nation will never use more foreign oil 
than we did in 1977 – never.  From now on, every new addition to our demand for 
energy will be met from our own production and our own conservation.  The 
generation-long growth in our dependence on foreign oil will be stopped dead in 
its tracks right now and then reversed as we move through the 1980’s. (Carter 
“Crisis of Confidence”) 
In this way, Carter integrated both literal and metaphorical arguments for environmental 
policy.  Carter noted that individual sacrifice produced “freedom” and the ability to 
sustain a peaceful American future.  
Every gallon of oil each one of us saves is a new form of production. It gives us 
more freedom, more confidence, that much more control over our own lives.  So, 
the solution of our energy crisis can also help us to conquer the crisis of the spirit 
in our country. It can rekindle our sense of unity, our confidence in the future, and 
give our nation and all of us individually a new sense of purpose.  You know we 
can do it. We have the natural resources. We have more oil in our shale alone than 
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several Saudi Arabias. We have more coal than any nation on Earth. We have the 
world's highest level of technology. We have the most skilled work force, with 
innovative genius, and I firmly believe that we have the national will to win this 
war. (Carter “Crisis of Confidence”) 
By noting both the reality of the effects of the energy crisis on national security and 
metaphorically equating the fight for oil independence as a “war,” Carter depicted the 
American people at risk from both foreign blackmail and foreign invasion.  Despite the 
rhetorical dedication to decrease consumption, oil imports have increased under every 
presidency since Carter, and 2010 levels are set to double the amount imported during the 
Carter administration. 
In concert with the rhetorical transition from environmental policy to energy 
policy, “media attention to environmental problems began to decline after 1970, and such 
problems were eclipsed” by the energy crisis (Dunlap 96).  During this period, the 
percentage of people who thought that environmental concerns were America’s “most 
important problem” dropped from ten percent to two percent (Dunlap 96).  Similarly, the 
percentage of people that believing that “environmental protection laws and regulations 
have gone too far” increased from 13 percent to 25 percent between 1973 and 1980 
(Dunlap 98).  Over twice as many Americans thought that the U.S. was spending too 
much money protecting the environment between 1973 and 1980 (Dunlap 98).  Despite 
this, the public motivation for having “adequate energy” as opposed to “protecting the 
environment” increased from 37 percent to 45 percent between 1973 and 1980 (Dunlap 
98).  Finally, at the end of the Carter administration, 32 percent of Americans thought 
that if posed with a choice, they would rather “sacrifice environmental quality” than 
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“sacrifice economic growth” – a jump of 11 percent from the beginning of his 
administration (Dunlap 98).  
 Ronald Reagan, taking a similarly conservative rhetorical approach, purported 
that: “[t]he best answer, while conservation is worthy in itself, is to try to make us 
independent of outside sources to the greatest extent possible for our energy” (Reagan “Q 
and A”).  However, his oil and environmental rhetoric is sparse; and, when he did choose 
to speak about the environment, his rhetoric certainly did not match his policy in the 
environmental arena.  In fact, throughout this tenure, he “exceeded environmentalists 
worst fears” and “sought to eliminate virtually every government program aimed at 
reducing oil dependence” (Dunap 102; Hjorth 72). 
 A search for Ronald Reagan’s environmental rhetoric yields few results.  Most of 
Reagan’s environmental rhetoric centers on energy and fossil fuel consumption, not on 
environmental consequences of energy consumption.  Before his tenure as president, 
Reagan delivered a nomination acceptance speech at the Republican National 
Convention.  In this address, Reagan posited his environmental policy as one of increased 
consumption and economic growth.  While Carter’s plea for oil independence focused on 
domestic development of both renewable and non-renewable sources, Reagan focused 
much more on the latter: 
Large amounts of oil and natural gas lay beneath our land and off our shores, 
untouched because the present administration seems to believe the American 
people would rather see more regulation, taxes, and controls than more 
energy…Coal offers great potential…it must not be thwarted by a tiny minority 
opposed to economic growth which often finds friendly ears in regulatory 
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agencies for its obstructionist campaigns…we are going to reaffirm that the 
economic prosperity is a fundamental part of our environment.  Our problems are 
both acute and chronic; yet all we hear from those in positions of leadership are 
the same tired proposals for government tinkering, more meddling and more 
control – all of which led us to this state in the first place.  (Reagan “1980 
Acceptance Speech”) 
As President, Reagan admitted that environmental policies were not as relevant as many 
of his other domestic and foreign initiatives; instead, he was “disinterested in 
environmental policymaking” (Short 137).  Martin Anderson, Reagan’s economic 
adviser, appealed to Reagan that: “Having clean air and low gasoline prices will be of 
small consolation in the midst of rolling blackouts, rising unemployment and mile-long 
gasoline lines” (Anderson 461).  Since the “Reagan revolution” was one of domestic 
energy development and economic prosperity, the nation’s environmental policy “had to 
be consistent” with these pillars.  Thus, mass de-regulation and devolution of 
environmental authority occurred – all to the detriment of environmental sustainability 
(Short 138).  
 Analysis of public environmentalism during the Reagan period provides an 
important counterexample to presidential environmentalism up to this point.  While 
presidents surely are influential in shaping public opinion: 
Reagan was not at all successful in lower the public’s commitment to 
environmental protection.  In fact, quite the contrary seems to have occurred.  In 
each case there is a pattern of increasing commitment to environmental protection 
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during the Reagan administration, often followed by further increase during the 
first 2 years of the Bush administration. (Dunlap 103) 
Public opinion polling from 1981-1989 shows an increase in support for environmental 
protection by 12 percentage points (Dunlap 104).  A Roper poll indicates that 71 percent 
of the public thought that the government was spending too little to protect the 
environment, as opposed to 4 percent who believed that the government was spending too 
much (Dunlap 104).  The number of people willing to sacrifice economic growth for 
environmental quality increased from 41 to 64 percent during the Reagan onslaught 
against environmental protection (Dunlap 104).  The explanation, ironically, may still be 
found in Reagan’s rhetorical approach: 
[M]uch of the increased support for environmental protection in the 1980s 
probably stemmed from the public’s apprehension that, unlike its predecessors, 
the Reagan administration could not be trusted to protect the 
environment…Indeed, large numbers of people became sufficiently concerned 
that they joined environmental organizations for the first time, producing sizable 
membership gains for many of the national organizations in the 1980s…This 
interpretation is strengthened by considerable evidence that the public was aware 
of the administration’s poor environmental record and that, in general, the public 
believes that the government should assume responsibility for environmental 
protection. (Dunlap 106) 
Public sentiment during the 1980s provides strong evidence that one motivating factor for 
rising public concern is the increased awareness of ecological problems, not simply 
presidential rhetoric (Dunlap 106). 
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 Even though environmentalism was not Reagan’s primary concern, his rhetorical 
commitment to the war on drugs provides important historical insight.  Reagan 
substantially escalated (both rhetorically and politically) the metaphorical war on drugs: 
My generation will remember how America swung into action when we were 
attacked in World War II. The war was not just fought by the fellows flying the 
planes or driving the tanks. It was fought at home by a mobilized nation…now 
we're in another war for our freedom, and it's time for all of us to pull together 
again....When we all come together, united, striving for this cause, then those who 
are killing America and terrorizing it with slow but sure chemical destruction will 
see that they are up against the mightiest force for good that we know. Then they 
will have no dark alleyways to hide in…We Americans have never been morally 
neutral against any form of tyranny. Tonight we're asking no more than that we 
honor what we have been and what we are by standing together. Now we go on to 
the next stop: making a final commitment not to tolerate drugs by anyone, 
anytime, anyplace. So, won't you join us in this great, new national crusade 
(Reagan “Speech from the White House”). 
Unlike most military conflicts in which the United States had been involved up to that 
point, the problem of rampant drug addiction required decades of progressive social 
change.  Winning small battles was no guarantor of success in the “war on drugs.”  Drug 
use actually began to decline before the “war” was declared, which made gains difficult 
to attribute to policy changes (Best 152).  Moreover, “drug warriors [found] themselves 
sandwiched between pessimists who insist[ed] that no punitive policy [could] succeed 
and antidrug enthusiasts arguing for escalation because the existing forces, tactics and so 
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on [weren’t] enough to win” (Best 152).  Much like in times of literal war, winning 
battles only encouraged more force and escalation because advocates could point to 
supposed proof that the war could be won.  Ironically, “winning” the war on drugs was 
largely assumed to mean the eradication of drug use, not mere reductions; therefore, the 
war was lost before it was even started (Best 152). 
Not only did the war on drugs fail in creating a sustainable base of support, it 
failed to prevent illicit drug use, is wildly expensive, and clogs our justice system; but, it 
is politically untouchable largely because “America doesn’t lose wars:” 
After three decades of increasingly punitive policies, illicit drugs are more easily 
available, drug potencies are greater, drug killings are more common, and drug 
barons are richer than ever. The War on Drugs costs Washington more than the 
Commerce, Interior, and State departments combined - and it's the one budget 
item whose growth is never questioned. A strangled court system, exploding 
prisons, and wasted lives push the cost beyond measure. What began as a flourish 
of campaign rhetoric in 1968 has grown into a monster. And while nobody claims 
that the War on Drugs is a success, nobody suggests an alternative. Because to do 
so, as Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders learned, is political suicide. (Baum 1) 
Even worse, the propaganda campaign in support of the war on drugs was so great that 
many of the facts are unavailable to the broader public.   
The metaphorical war on drugs became unfortunately literal.  The United States 
military, during Reagan’s second term, was provided with increased funding and 
responsibility to enforce the war on drugs domestically; “on April 8, 1986, President 
Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) declaring drug trafficking 
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a threat to U.S. national security, thus sanctioning a more rapid expansion of U.S. 
military participation…” (Bagley 4).  Funding was drastically increased in response to 
this widely popular Decision Directive, and the metaphorical war on drugs became literal. 
Beyond domestic military involvement, the United States exported its war to 
source and transit countries, largely without foreign cooperation and against the will of 
the general public within those countries (Friman 3-4).  The United States now provides 
military assistance to several Latin American countries and uses forceful interdiction to 
prevent illicit drugs from reaching the United States, in spite of consistent Department of 
Defense opposition (Mabry 76-77).  Drug smuggling is so prevalent and techniques for 
sale are so well developed that the only way the military could make progress in the 
metaphorical war on drugs was to fight a literal war (Mabry 86).  Unfortunately, the 
enemy is not easily identifiable, ensuring civilian casualties and backlash at the use of 
military force; thus, the military solution was “set up to fail” (Mabry 86). 
President George H.W. Bush “entered the presidency after eight years in which 
the White House, citing economic concerns, attempted to dismantle, weaken, or delay 
efforts at improving the environment at the expense of industry and business” (Carcasson 
“Global Gridlock” 266).  Interestingly, Bush chose to distance himself from Reagan’s 
anti-environmental stance; instead deeming himself a conservationist and an 
environmentalist (Daynes and Sussman 155).  However, in an effort to “smooth the 
transition from Reagan” Bush used similar economic justifications for his environmental 
policy (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 266).  Speaking at the swearing-in Ceremony for 
Bush’s EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, Bush repeated the theme that Americans 
deserve both economic growth and a clean environment: 
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I want to broaden the consensus for a clean environment, and I believe doing that 
requires finding ways to clean up the environment without stifling the economy. 
During the campaign I noted that environmental action has too often been marked 
by confrontation among competing interests. Well, the fact is that more often than 
not there is common ground if the parties will make an effort to find it. Our great 
common desire is a better life for all Americans. And I believe that economic 
growth and a clean environment are both part of what all Americans understand a 
better life to mean. (George H.W. Bush) 
However, the economic recession of the early 1990’s brought a tone of economic 
nationalism to Bush’s environmental rhetoric.  No longer could the United States both 
grow economically and regulate the environment; rather, regulations were unacceptable 
because they would “throw an awful lot of people out of work” (Bush “Agricultural 
Community”).   
Bush also integrated justifications and appeals based on national security and oil 
independence to argue both for energy conservation and expanded offshore domestic oil 
drilling.  In his 1989 State of the Union, he emphasized that: 
[T]he gulfs and oceans off our shores hold the promise of oil and gas reserves 
which can make our nation more secure and less dependent on foreign oil. And 
when those with the most promise can be tapped safely, as with much of the 
Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, we should proceed. (H.W. Bush) 
In 1991, towards the end of the Gulf War, H.W. Bush tied oil independence to global 
peace and freedom: 
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Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to 
stop Saddam now, not later. They know that this brutal dictator will do anything, 
will use any weapon, will commit any outrage, no matter how many innocents 
suffer.  They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources 
does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression. They know that we 
need to build a new, enduring peace, based not on arms races and confrontation 
but on shared principles and the rule of law. (H.W. Bush “1991 State of Union”) 
Oil was linked with the most rhetorically powerful components of national security 
rhetoric – proliferation and war.  Thus, oil became a justification for the lives lost in the 
Gulf war, and the war became a necessary reason to limit dependence on fossil fuels. 
 Despite his support for deregulation of the environment, limited federal power, 
and unlimited economic growth, H.W. Bush’s tenure oversaw important environmental 
legislation.  In response to the exigence created by the Exxon Valdez tanker spill, 
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act and amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act that 
imposed substantial regulations on pollution and environmental degradation.  Two years 
after the Exxon tanker spill, the Energy Policy Act was enacted – a policy that included 
conservation and efficiency measures as well as incentives for renewable energy 
development (Daynes and Sussman 163).  However, this “level of legislative success was 
minimal compared to Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter, who never 
claimed to be environmental presidents” (Daynes and Sussman 164).  After a year of 
short-term and limited environmentalism: 
Bush appeared to lose much of zeal for environmental reform.  His concerns 
about the costs of environmental regulation rose sharply.  The president’s rhetoric 
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remained benignly green, but his actions belied his speechwriters…his staff 
downplayed the threat of acid rain and inflated the cost of cleaning the nation’s 
air. (Shabecoff 244) 
Bush’s international approach to environmentalism yielded similarly mixed results as he 
“failed to offer leadership regarding biodiversity and global warming” (Daynes and 
Sussman 167).   
 Public opinion polling from the first Bush administration is enigmatic.  While 
there was a “high concern for environmental issues in general” this was not strong 
enough to change voting decisions (Carcasson “Prudence” 131).  Thus, Bush employed 
rhetorical environmental strategies that were vague and supportive of the environment in 
general, but not in support of specific policies.  Moreover, the economic decline of the 
early 1990s made the pursuit of strong environmental policy politically difficult 
(Carcasson “Prudence” 131).  Linking public opinion to the H.W. Bush is difficult given 
the extreme disjoint between his progressive environmental rhetoric and his conservative 
environmental policy. 
 If H.W. Bush was an environmentalist running for president, Clinton was the 
environmental president.  He was elected with environmentalism as a central pillar of his 
campaign.  His choice of Al Gore as running mate was indicative of his commitment to 
environmental regulation and reform.  However, the “core vision” of his candidacy was 
“the centrality of jobs, education and competitiveness in the global economy” (Cox 160).  
Clinton posited economic growth and environmental protection as positive-sum: “We can 
and we must protect the environment while advancing prosperity of the American 
people” (Clinton “Decision 96”).  This “jobs-first policy” hindered substantial 
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environmental reform and left the environmental movement largely disappointed by the 
compromises of their environmental president (Clinton “San Diego”).  Clinton argued 
that: “[w]e have always found a way to clean the environment and grow the economy at 
the same time. And when it comes to global warming, we will do it again” (Clinton 
“1998 State of Union”). 
Clinton’s environmental policy reflected this rhetorical choice of using economics 
as a primary justification for environmental policy.  Within months of entering the White 
House, Clinton allowed logging on federal lands, limited regulations on the Everglades 
and signed the environmentally devastating North American Free Trade Agreement (Cox 
162).  Clinton, secondarily to his economic justifications, used non-environmental 
justifications based on energy independence and national security. Clinton stated to 
Congress in fall of 1995 that:  
“I am today concurring with the Department of Commerce’s finding that the 
nation’s growing reliance on imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products 
threaten the nation’s security because they increase U.S. vulnerability to oil 
supply interruptions” (Clinton “Energy Report”).   
Polling data from four years later shows that this message was enduring: “an 
overwhelming majority of Americans believe that rising oil imports are a threat to our 
economic, environmental and national security” (Murkowski 116).  When referencing oil 
independence, Clinton continuously emphasized both national security and economic 
security – drawing on both dominant non-environmental frames.   
“The environmental president” oversaw the Congressional session that had “the 
worst environmental record in 25 years” (Matthews A29).  The fact that his rhetoric did 
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not match his actions brought cries of betrayal from the environmental movement and 
advocacy groups like the Sierra Club and World Wildlife Fund (Cox 163).  
Unexpectedly, public environmentalism declined during Clinton’s tenure as well.  A 
1999 Gallup poll showed that fifty percent of Americans considered themselves 
environmentalists, a twenty-eight percent decline from 1990 and a thirteen percent 
decline from 1995 (Gallup “1999” q. 3).  Even as the science behind the global warming 
hypothesis began to reach consensus, Clinton’s rhetorical approach was not successfully 
convincing the public that global warming demanded a government response.  During his 
second term, the number of people who thought that global warming was a “very serious” 
problem changed very little, from 46 to 47 percent – a small change within the margin for 
error (Newsweek “2000” q. 1).  The same poll indicates that only 12 percent of the public 
viewed global warming as “the most important problem facing the world today” 
(Newsweek “2000” q. 2).  Clinton left office with a majority of the public supporting “tax 
breaks to provide incentives for drilling for more oil and gas in the U.S.” and 
overwhelming opposition to “setting legal limits on the amount of energy which average 
consumers can use” (Gallup “2001” q. 3). 
George W. Bush, despite reaping great profit from oil subsidies directed towards 
subsidiaries in the Middle East during the first Bush administration, made oil 
independence the core concern of his environmental agenda.  In his 2006 State of the 
Union address, he argued for the national security benefits achievable through oil 
independence: 
Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a 
serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from 
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unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through 
technology…Our goal is to make this new kind of ethanol practical and 
competitive within 6 years.  Breakthroughs on this and other new technologies 
will help us reach another great goal: To replace more than 75 percent of our oil 
imports from the Middle East by 2025. By applying the talent and technology of 
America, this country can dramatically improve our environment, move beyond a 
petroleum-based economy, and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a 
thing of the past. (Bush “2006 State of the Union”) 
By connecting “oil dependence” to the “Middle East,” Bush hoped to associate public 
motivation over the wars in the Middle East with his energy policy.   
Bush, much like his father, entered the White House claiming to be an 
environmentalist.  However, Bush largely supported a Reagan-style approach that 
favored deregulation, devolution of authority and a “probusiness agenda” that framed 
environmental policies in terms of economic and national security (Daynes and Sussman 
189).  He rhetorically justified his environmental and energy policy with the same themes 
used since Roosevelt, emphasizing that the United States can both “develop our national 
resources and protect the environment” (Bush ix).  The emphasis that development and 
consumption was necessary for both growth and environmental sustainability was the 
basis of his economic argument.  He used similar arguments to justify drilling in the 
Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge and in opposition to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.  
When Bush did issue policies in favor of environmental protection, they were net-
negative for the environment because they included environmentally unfriendly 
amendments.  For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included incentives dedicated 
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towards conservation and alternative energy; however, it also included billions of dollars 
in subsides to the fossil fuel industry (Daynes and Sussman 199). 
 Bush, a self-proclaimed environmentalist, had an awfully poor environmental 
track record in his eight years in office.  He, unlike conservative environmentalists before 
him, specifically ignored and discredited climate change science: “by the end of his first 
term in office, scientists at NASA and NOAA complained about censorship imposed at 
their respective agencies” over their global warming findings (Daynes and Sussman 206-
207).  The impact of this rhetorical choice is lasting; public skepticism of global warming 
science increased under the Bush presidency (Nisbet 14). Bush imposed substantial 
constraints on the environmental movement, left a terrible environmental legacy and 
spent eight years deemphasizing environmental concerns. 
 Public opinion polling shows a similar, yet less extreme, response to Bush’s 
environmental rhetoric and policy as occurred during the Reagan administration.  The 
percentage of the public that thought that global warming was the “most important 
environmental problem facing the world today” increased three-fold during the Bush 
administration (Newsweek “2007” q. 2).  This increase in public motivation in support of 
global warming policy coincided with an 8 percent increase in Americans who 
“disapproved” of the way Bush was “handling the environment” (Newsweek “2007” q. 
1).  However, public support for environmental policy began to slide towards the end of 
the Bush administration – a 6 percent decrease in his final year (ABC News q. 4).  
Dunlap’s explanation of public environmentalism during the Reagan administration 
provides a plausible explanation for public sentiment during the second Bush 
administration as well.  While presidential support of environmental policy can act as a 
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motivator, rampant presidential anti-environmentalism may provoke a backlash that 
triggers public opinion change as well. 
Conclusion 
 The last seventy years of presidential environmental rhetoric has contained a 
plethora of strategies to support public environmentalism: moral, economic, national 
security and environmental.  From Franklin Roosevelt to George W. Bush, modern 
environmentalism has witnessed transformation, rise and regress.  Aligning presidential 
rhetoric with changes in public attitude may provide significant insight into the effects 
that presidential rhetoric has on both public motivation and environmental policy.  
Specifically, the rhetorical strategies used by environmental presidents like Roosevelt and 
Kennedy may help guide environmentalist presidents in the future.  Moreover, historical 
presidential rhetoric that emphasizes specific justifications for environmental policy may 
create an antecedent genre that requires presidents of the future to use similar strategies.  
While it is difficult to provide a deterministic analysis of exactly how presidential 
environmental rhetoric is received by an audience, the premise that presidential rhetoric 
has influence is widely accepted (Cohen 88).  Thus, analysis of the Obama 
administration’s rhetorical tactics, as they relate to historical rhetorical strategies, may 






Chapter Three – President Barack Obama’s Environmental Rhetoric 
Introduction 
On July 8 2008, less than four months before the presidential election, Barack 
Obama met with leading environmental advocates for a strategy session at his campaign 
headquarters in Chicago, Illinois.  He summoned: “a cross section of experts, including 
top executives from three utilities and two oil companies, the chief energy economist of 
an investment bank, a climate scientist, a California energy and environment expert, an 
oil consultant-historian, and several campaign staffers” (Mufson and Eilperin para. 2).  
Obama left the strategy session hoping to make his environmental advocacy “pop more” 
(Mufson and Eiplerin para. 5).  At this time, campaign strategists argue, Obama turned 
from tactics of moral and environmental suasion to pragmatic and more politically salient 
justifications for environmental policy (Mufson and Eilperin para. 3). This strategy 
session determined that Obama’s primary rhetorical strategy to motivate public 
environmentalism should focus on “economic competitiveness” and job creation (Mufson 
and Eilperin para. 3).  This strategy could promote environmentalism by emphasizing 
green jobs, economic prosperity, new incentives and tax breaks for businesses and 
winning the international race for green energy.  “Internal polling” also revealed that 
Obama could successfully motivate the public to support his environmental policy 
through a second salient justification: national security (Mufson and Eilperin para. 3).  
National security justifications can be summarized as the attempt to motivate policy 
through appeals to appeals to primacy and human safety, specifically: winning the war on 
terrorism, weaning the United States from oil dependence and promoting effective 
military readiness.  While this strategy session shows that Obama’s intention was to use 
52 
these specific thematic justifications for environmental policy, a close examination of 
Obama’s texts is necessary to determine whether this motivation actually influenced his 
approach. 
Justifications for Environmental Policy 
Upon examination, the two major themes advocated at the campaign strategy 
emerge: economics and national security.  This section will present a substantial 
subsection of Obama’s justifications for environmental policy to show these themes, or 
arguments, at work.  While these arguments are noted in this section as “distinct,” they 
are interrelated and proposed together by Obama in many instances.  For example, 
Obama argues that “oil dependence” is both an economic and a national security threat.  
Therefore, I begin this section with Obama’s purely economic justifications, follow with 
Obama’s dyadic and triadic justifications, and end with Obama’s arguments based solely 
on national security benefits. 
There are two approaches Obama used, in the first seventeen months of his 
presidency, to emphasize economic benefits of his environmental policy.  First, Obama 
posited his environmental policy as necessary for the United States to remain competitive 
in a global race for environmental and technological leadership.  Second, Obama 
highlighted that his policies were the best route to prosperity, growth and job creation.  In 
an address to the Department of Energy on February 5th 2009, Obama made the case for 
both economic prosperity and competitiveness:  
Our approach to energy is the right one. It's what America needs right now, and 
we need to move forward today. We can't keep on having the same, old 
arguments over and over again that lead us to the exact same spot, where we are 
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wasting precious energy, we're not creating jobs, we're failing to compete in the 
global economy, and we end up bickering at a time when the economy urgently 
needs action. (Obama “Energy Department”) 
These themes – economic growth and international competitiveness – permeate Obama’s 
rhetorical decisions throughout the next seventeen months.   
Comparing United States policy to international energy development, Obama 
touted the ability of American ingenuity to lead the race towards technological 
leadership: 
Often, they take something more than imagination and dedication alone - often 
they take an investment from government. That's how we sent a man to the moon. 
That's how we were able to launch a world wide web. And it's how we'll build the 
clean energy economy that's the key to our competitiveness in the 21st century.  
We'll do this because we know that the nation that leads on energy will be the 
nation that leads the world in the 21st century. That's why, around the world, 
nations are racing to lead in these industries of the future. Germany is leading the 
world in solar power. Spain generates almost 30 percent of its power by 
harnessing the wind, while we manage less than one percent. And Japan is 
producing the batteries that currently power American hybrid cars. (Obama 
“Electric Car Plant”) 
To add political salience, Obama and his environmental strategists noted immediate 
economic and competitiveness benefits; however, this choice sidelined arguments 
depicting the large decline of the global environment. 
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 An analogous prioritization of economics over environmental justifications is 
found in Obama’s arguments for green jobs as well.  Obama argues that energy is one of 
the main emphases of the job producing stimulus package:  
And to spur hiring and sustain growth we've placed a big emphasis on energy. 
Just a few weeks ago, I announced a loan guarantee to break ground on the first 
new nuclear power plant in our country in nearly three decades -- a project right 
here in Georgia -- (applause) -- right here in Georgia -- a project that's going to 
create more than 3,000 construction jobs in the next few years and ultimately 800 
permanent jobs operating the plant. We're on track to create 700,000 jobs across 
America building advanced batteries for hybrid cars, and modernizing our electric 
grid, and doubling our capacity to generate clean energy. (Obama “Remarks on 
the Economy”) 
Noticeably missing from this argument is any environmental argument. The reason to 
support energy development was defined as job growth and prosperity, external benefits 
unassociated with any environmental impact: 
That's why when we fashioned the Recovery Act to get our economy moving 
again, we emphasized clean energy. Today, we're supporting the development of 
advanced battery technologies. We're doubling the capacity to generate renewable 
electricity. We're building a stronger, smarter electric grid, which will be essential 
to powering the millions of plug-in hybrids and cars and trucks that we hope to 
see on the roads.  It is estimated that through these investments, we will create or 
save more than 700,000 jobs. (Obama “Presidential Memorandum”) 
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In an address meant to commemorate the signing of a Presidential Memorandum 
outlining steps for cleaner energy, Obama spoke only of economic benefits.  While words 
like “hybrid” and “clean” may connote environmental benefits, the argument for 
economics posits these terms as economic, not environmental, accounts. 
Obama spoke with comparable sentiment in an address in Arcadia Florida to 
employees working at a solar energy center: 
So at this moment, there's something big happening in America when it comes to 
creating a clean energy economy, but getting there will take a few more days like 
this one and more projects like this one.  And I've often said that the creation of 
such an economy is going to require nothing less than the sustained effort of an 
entire nation; an all-hands-on-deck approach, similar to the mobilization that 
preceded World War II or the Apollo Project.  And I also believe that such a 
comprehensive piece of legislation that is taking place right now in Congress is 
going to be critical. That's going to finally make clean energy the profitable kind 
of energy in America: legislation that will make the best use of resources we have 
in abundance through clean coal technology, safe nuclear power, sustainably 
grown biofuels, and energy we harness from the wind, waves and sun. (Obama 
“Solar Energy Center”) 
Obama repeated the call for biofuels in an April address in Macon, Missouri.  Using 
similar economic strategies, Obama argued that biofuels had the potential to substantially 
boost job growth in the fact of the economic recession: 
It’s an investment that we expect will create or save up to 700,000 jobs across 
America by the end of 2012 -– jobs manufacturing next-generation batteries for 
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next-generation vehicles; jobs upgrading a smarter, stronger power grid; jobs 
doubling the capacity to generate renewable energy from sources like sun and 
wind and biofuels, just like you do here.  And that investment was part of the 
Recovery Act.  It included $800 million in funding for ethanol fueling 
infrastructure, biorefinery construction, advanced biofuels research to help us 
reach the goal that I’ve set, which is to more than triple America’s biofuels 
production in the next 12 years.  (Obama “POET Bioerefining”) 
Obama’s commitment to biofuels is even larger than the previous two presidents, who 
oversaw the beginning of the ethanol boom.  While economic growth was certainly one 
motivation, at stake was not just prosperity, but the very foundations of the American 
dream: 
We also know that our economic future depends on our leadership in the 
industries of the future.  Around the globe, countries are seeking an advantage in 
the global marketplace by investing in new ways of producing and saving energy. 
From China to Germany, these countries recognize that the nation that leads in the 
clean energy economy will lead the global economy, and I want America to be 
that nation. (Obama “Presidential Memorandum”) 
Inaction was not an option.   
The choice between a prosperous, competitive and safe America and relative 
decline was best determined by an investment in a clean-energy economy:  
We can cede the race for the 21st century or we can embrace the reality that our 
competitors already have: The nation that leads the world in creating a new clean-
energy economy will be the nation that leads the 21st-century global economy.  
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That's our choice, between a slow decline and renewed prosperity, between the 
past and the future. The American people have made their choice. They expect us 
to move forward right now at this moment of great challenge and stake our claim 
on the future, a stronger, cleaner, and more prosperous future where we meet our 
obligations to our citizens, our children, and to God's creation, and where the 
United States of America leads once again. (Obama “Remarks on Energy”) 
A nearly identical justification is found in Obama’s remarks in support of offshore oil 
drilling: 
And while our politics has remained entrenched along worn divides, the ground 
has shifted beneath our feet. Around the world, countries are seeking an edge in 
the global marketplace by investing in new ways of producing and saving energy. 
From China to Germany, these nations recognize that the country that leads the 
clean energy economy will be the country that leads the global economy. 
Meanwhile, here at home, as politicians in Washington debate endlessly whether 
to act, our own military has determined that we can't afford not to. (Obama 
“Remarks on Offshore Drilling”) 
Obama uses nearly indistinguishable arguments when supporting offshore drilling, 
nuclear power, biofuels, renewable energy and energy efficiency.  This monolithic 
approach disregards clear environmental distinctions between these energy choices and 
depicts each strategy as an economic or national security boon, while glossing over the 
possible environmental arguments – for or against. 
Relatedly, Obama’s appeals to ending the international offshoring of green energy 
jobs rely on appeals of green jobs, technological innovation and primacy:  
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 [M]ake no mistake. Whether it's nuclear energy or solar or wind energy, if we fail 
to invest in the technologies of tomorrow, then we're going to be importing those 
technologies instead of exporting them. We will fall behind. Jobs will be 
produced overseas instead of here in the United States of America. And that's not 
a future that I accept. (Obama “Job Training Center”) 
This argument against offshoring, no matter its environmental merit, appealed to national 
pride, patriotism and exceptionalism, because: “whoever builds a clean energy economy, 
whoever is at the forefront of that, is going to own the 21st century global economy” 
(Obama “Governor’s Address”). 
Economic justifications of competitiveness were also prevalent in Obama’s 2010 
State of the Union.  Arguing for policy to make the United States more competitive, 
Obama noted that:  
China’s not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany’s not waiting. India’s not 
waiting. These nations aren’t standing still. These nations aren’t playing for 
second place. They’re putting more emphasis on math and science. They’re 
rebuilding their infrastructure. They are making serious investments in clean 
energy because they want those jobs. (Obama “2010 State of the Union”) 
While competitiveness was one route to describe the economic benefits of environmental 
policy, the appeal to the unemployment concern was prevalent as well. 
Given the rising unemployment facing the United States as Obama’s term 
developed, Obama capitalized on this salient issue by emphasizing job creation as a 
benefit achieved from clean energy policy: 
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You can see the results of last year’s investment in clean energy – in the North 
Carolina company that will create 1200 jobs nationwide helping to make 
advanced batteries; or in the California business that will put 1,000 people to 
work making solar panels.  But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need 
more production, more efficiency, more incentives. (Obama “2010 State of the 
Union”) 
In parallel form, appeals to green energy were noticeably lacking of environmental 
appeals; rather, the argument for job creation was dominant: 
So we have the potential to create millions of jobs in this sector. These are jobs 
building more fuel-efficient cars and trucks to make us energy independent. These 
are jobs producing solar panels and erecting wind turbines. These are jobs 
designing and manufacturing and selling and installing more efficient building 
materials -- because 40 percent of the energy we use is used by our homes and 
buildings. Think about that. All of us know that we use a lot of gas in our cars. 
But in terms of energy usage, 40 percent of it goes to our homes and our 
buildings. (Obama “Remarks on the Economy”) 
By emphasizing the plethora of uses for green energy (e.g. cars, buildings and homes) 
Obama appealed to a broad swath of potential consumers.   
 While environmental justifications can be found scattered throughout Obama’s 
texts – Obama argues for the health of the “planet” four times in the texts analyzed – 
Obama’s environmental arguments support economics and job creation as the a priori 
justification: 
60 
But the reason we're here [italics added] is because it also means igniting a new, 
clean-energy economy that generates good jobs right here in the United States.  
Now, we've talked about this for decades. We talked about how our dependence 
on fossil fuels threatened our economy. But after all the talk, a lot of times our 
will to act rose and fell depending on what the price of a gallon of gas was at the 
pump. During the summer when prices went up, everybody was all for clean 
energy. And when prices went back down, suddenly everybody forgot about it. 
(Obama “Siemens Wind Turbine”) 
“The reason we’re here” implies a priority of job creation and economic prosperity.  
Notice, Obama does not say “one of the reasons we are here”; rather, Obama dissociates 
environmental policy from environmentalism by creating an explicit and sole association 
with economics. 
 This prioritization of economics as the leading justification is also resembled in 
Obama’s remarks on offshore drilling: 
But the bottom line is [italics added] this: given our energy needs, in order to 
sustain economic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses competitive, 
we're going to need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as we ramp up 
production of new sources of renewable, homegrown energy. (Obama “Offshore 
Drilling”) 
The “bottom line” is a reference to the last line of an audit that depicts whether the audit 
has determined profit or loss.  It epitomizes the decisive point or most important place to 
look; in this case, that most important place was prosperity, job growth and 
competiveness. 
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In a rhetorical move that degrades non-economic justifications for the BP 
response, Obama argued: 
If nothing else, this disaster should serve as a wake-up call that it's time to move 
forward on this legislation. It's time to accelerate the competition with countries 
like China who have already realized the future lies in renewable energy. And it's 
time to seize that future ourselves. 
The choice to posit the competitiveness benefits of the governmental response to the BP 
spill as the “if nothing else” result, ironically, models the “bottom line” approach used in 
Obama’s arguments for offshore oil drilling.  “If nothing else” connotes that if politicians 
can agree on little about the best approach to respond to the crisis, the one area in which 
consensus can be achieved is in the economic argument. 
Closely tied to some of Obama’s economic arguments is an appeal to energy 
independence.  This appeal enthymematically ties economic security to national security: 
We estimate, for example, that we can increase fuel economy by as much as 25 
percent in tractor trailers, using technologies that already exist today. And just 
like the rule concerning cars, this standard will spur growth in the clean energy 
sector.  We know how important that is. We know that our dependence on foreign 
oil endangers our security and our economy. (Obama “Presidential 
Memorandum”) 
Notably, Obama calls for incentives for energy development, not regulations against 
those who degrade the environment.  The potential implication of this frame and policy 
choice is explored in chapter four. 
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Soon after this plea, Obama uses almost the duplicated justifications for non-
renewable energy (fossil fuels), biofuels, and renewable sources: 
It means making tough decisions about opening new offshore areas for oil and gas 
development. It means continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal 
technologies. And yes, it means passing a comprehensive energy and climate bill 
with incentives that will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy in 
America. (Obama “2010 State of the Union”) 
As noted above, the economic argument equates all potential energy approaches and 
disregards the clear environmental distinctions between energy from renewable and non-
renewable sources. 
In the final address listed in the Washington Post database, delivered on July 15th,  
Obama, yet again, used the justifications of economic growth and competitiveness to 
justify a transition to a clean energy economy: 
[T]hese aren’t just any jobs. These are jobs in the industries of the future. Just a 
few years ago, American businesses manufactured only 2 percent of the world’s 
advanced batteries for electric and hybrid vehicles -- 2 percent. But because of 
what’s happening in places like this, in just five years we’ll have up to 40 percent 
of the world’s capacity -- 40 percent.  So for years you’ve been hearing about 
manufacturing jobs disappearing overseas. You are leading the way in showing 
how manufacturing jobs are coming right back here to the United States of 
America. (Obama “Investing in Clean Energy”) 
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The first seventeen months of Obama’s presidential environmental rhetoric shows a clear 
theme: the privileging of the positive economic benefits of environmental policy as a 
dominant frame.   
 However, secondary and complimentary frames emerge as well.  For example, 
while Obama often chose to privilege economic justifications, many times those were 
coupled with appeals to national security and energy independence:  
The key is to understand that this is a key component, a key part of a 
comprehensive strategy to move us from an economy that just runs on fossil fuels 
to one that relies on more homegrown fuels and clean energy. I believe that we 
can come together around this issue and pass comprehensive energy and climate 
legislation that will ignite new industries, spark new jobs in towns just like Fort 
Madison, make America more energy- independent. (Obama “Siemens Wind 
Turbine) 
At times, Obama notes economics, national security, and environmental concerns in 
single environmental statements.  The environmental arguments, in these instances, are 
often passing and vague: 
Moving toward clean energy is about our security. It's about our economy. And 
it's about the future of our planet. And what I hope is that the policies we've laid 
out -- from hybrid fleets to offshore drilling, from nuclear energy to wind energy -
- underscore the seriousness with which my administration takes this challenge. 
It's a challenge that requires us to think and act anew. (Obama “Offshore 
Drilling”) 
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Correspondingly, in a summer of 2009 address about “innovation and jobs” Obama used 
a triad of justifications for his environmental policy: economics, national security and 
environmental pollution: 
[E]nergy is one of the pillars of this new foundation, essential both to our 
recovery and our long-term prosperity.  I'm pleased to say that we've achieved 
more in the last few months to create a new clean energy economy than we had 
achieved in many decades before. The recovery plan will double our country's 
supply of renewable energy and is already creating new clean energy jobs.  
Thanks to a remarkable partnership between automakers, auto workers, 
environmental advocates and states, we also set in motion a new national policy to 
increase gas mileage and decrease carbon pollution for all new cars and trucks 
sold in this country, which is going to save us 1.8 billion barrels of oil.  And last 
Friday, the House of Representatives passed an extraordinary piece of legislation 
that would make renewable energy the profitable kind of energy in America. It 
will reduce our dependence on foreign oil, it will prevent the worst consequences 
of climate change, and above all it holds the promise of millions of new jobs; 
jobs, by the way, that can't be outsourced. (Obama “Innovation and Jobs”) 
Despite these fleeting references to environmental sustainability, Obama relies more 
heavily on the national security justification, as an addition to the economic acrgument, 
in the majority of his public addresses.   
In his first presidential address related to the environment, Obama pointed to 
legislative delay over environmental policy as the reason that the United States was “held 
hostage to…hostile regimes” (Obama “Energy Independence”).  He argued that ending 
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oil dependence a necessary step to “deny leverage to dictators and dollars to terrorists 
(Obama “Energy Independence”).  In support of the environmental components of his 
first stimulus package, Obama argued that:  
These are extraordinary times, and it calls for swift and extraordinary action.  At a 
time of such great challenge for America, no single issue is as fundamental to our 
future as energy.  America's dependence on oil is one of the most serious threats 
that our nation has faced. It bankrolls dictators, pays for nuclear proliferation and 
funds both sides of our struggle against terrorism. It puts the American people at 
the mercy of shifting gas prices, stifles innovation, and sets back our ability to 
compete. (Obama “Energy Independence”) 
The United States’ involvement in two wars in the Middle East added salience to 
Obama’s plea to limit support of dictators and enact legislation that made the war on 
terrorism more winnable.  Throughout the next seventeen months, Obama emphasized 
the dependence on foreign oil as a danger to national security forty-five times, in over 
thirty public addresses. 
 Importantly, Obama used national security as a justification for his environmental 
policy that could be supported even absent belief in the science supporting the global 
warming hypothesis: “[s]o even if you don't believe in the severity of climate change, as I 
do, you still should want to pursue this agenda. It's good for our national security and 
reducing our dependence on foreign oil.  It's good for our economy because it will 
produce jobs” (Obama “Governor’s Address”).   
 In a March 2010 address about offshore oil drilling, Obama stated that: “moving 
toward clean energy is about our security” (Obama “Offshore Drilling”).  Obama 
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militarizes the move to clean energy by arguing that since the military is supporting the 
move to clean energy, it must be the right move for America as a whole: 
Meanwhile, here at home, as politicians in Washington debate endlessly whether 
to act, our own military has determined that we can't afford not to.  If there was 
any doubt about that, you need only look to the F-18 fighter and the light armored 
vehicle behind me. The Army and Marine Corps have been testing this vehicle on 
a mixture of biofuels. And this Navy fighter jet -- called the Green Hornet -- will 
be flown for the first time in just a few weeks, on Earth Day. If tests go as 
planned, it will be the first plane ever to fly faster than the speed of sound on a 
fuel mix that's half biomass. The Air Force is also testing jet engines using 
biofuels and had the first successful biofuel-powered test flight just last week. 
Though I don't want to drum up any kind of rivalry.  Now, the Pentagon isn't 
seeking these alternative fuels just to protect our environment; they are pursuing 
these homegrown energy sources to protect our national security. Our military 
leaders recognize the security imperative of increasing the use of alternative fuels, 
decreasing energy use, and reducing our reliance on imported oil. (Obama 
“Offshore Drilling) 
Obama chose to disregard the discussion of environmental sustainability by noting that 
the military “isn’t just” developing alternative fuels for the environment; rather, they 
have national security concerns as an equal if not greater motivation. 
 Obama used a complementary rhetorical strategy of noting military responses to 
environmental problems when discussing the BP Oil Spill.  On June 1st 2010, Obama 
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argued that the “threat” from the spread of oil was being countered by a large military 
response: 
Until the well is stopped, we'll multiply our efforts to meet the growing threat and 
to address the widespread and unbelievably painful losses experienced by the 
people along the Gulf Coast.  What's being threatened; what's being lost isn't just 
the source of income but a way of life, not just fishable waters but a national 
treasure. There are now more than 20,000 men and women in the region working 
around the clock to contain and clean up the oil.  We've authorized more than 
17,000 National Guard members to respond across four states. (Obama “BP Oil 
Commission”) 
While Obama’s choice to emphasize the military response may have been received as 
off-the-cuff or tangential in early June, 14 days later the transformation of his rhetorical 
environmental strategy became much more evident. 
 On June 15th 2010, Obama delivered an address on the BP Oil Spill – his first 
from the Oval Office.  This address was intended to convince the public that the Obama 
administration understood the magnitude of the threat and was responding in kind.  
Obama used the military metaphor to analogize the government response to the war on 
terrorism: 
As we speak, our nation faces a multitude of challenges. At home, our top priority 
is to recover and rebuild from a recession that has touched the lives of nearly 
every American. Abroad, our brave men and women in uniform are taking the 
fight to al Qaeda wherever it exists. And tonight, I’ve returned from a trip to the 
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Gulf Coast to speak with you about the battle we’re waging against an oil spill 
that is assaulting our shores and our citizens. (Obama “BP Address”) 
Obama promised that the government was already “fighting for months and even years” 
the “epidemic” of oil dependence, and argued that the administration will “fight this spill 
with everything we’ve got for as long as it takes” (Obama “BP Address”).  The address 
laid out the “battle plan” for going forward against the spread of oil (Obama “BP 
Address”).  Resembling earlier arguments, Obama emphasized the military response to 
the crisis: 
I’ve authorized the deployment of over 17,000 National Guard members along the 
coast. These servicemen and women are ready to help stop the oil from coming 
ashore, they’re ready to help clean the beaches, train response workers, or even 
help with processing claims -- and I urge the governors in the affected states to 
activate these troops as soon as possible. (Obama “BP Address”) 
The “fight” and “battle” references continued to emerge from Obama’s addresses about 
the oil spill for the next month (Obama “Meeting with BP execs”; “Cabinet Meeting”; 
“Clean Energy”).  In the days following the BP Oval Office address, Obama stated that 
he wanted “all Americans to know that [he] will continue to fight each and every day 
until the oil is contained” (Obama “Meeting with BP execs”).  Obama used the “context 
of the oil spill” to argue that oil independence was a necessary move for the United States 
to achieve “national security” (Obama “Cabinet Meeting”). 
The BP Oil Spill offered a significant opportunity for Obama to reframe his 
environmental policy in favor of environmental justifications for his environmental 
policy.  In some ways, Obama took this opportunity to do just that.  In his Oval Office 
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Address on the BP Oil Spill, Obama used phrases like “clean beaches,” “environmental 
disaster,” and “environmental cleanup” which emphasized the environmental harm that 
was taking place in the Gulf (Obama “BP Address”).  However, when discussing how the 
spill should act as an impetus for broader environmental reform, Obama deemphasized 
the environmental benefits of his policies by defining the problems in terms of economics 
and national security as well: 
Now, there are costs associated with this transition. And there are some who 
believe that we can’t afford those costs right now. I say we can’t afford not to 
change how we produce and use energy -– because the long-term costs to our 
economy, our national security, and our environment are far greater. (Obama “BP 
Address”). 
While the BP Spill offered an avenue to tie his environmental agenda to a visible 
environmental concern, Obama instead chose to frame the issue in the same manner as 
the fifteen months of his presidency.  He argued for “clean energy jobs” and claimed that 
since “countries like China are investing in clean energy jobs” then the United States 
must remain competitive: 
Time and again, the path forward has been blocked -- not only by oil industry 
lobbyists, but also by a lack of political courage and candor.  The consequences of 
our inaction are now in plain sight. Countries like China are investing in clean 
energy jobs and industries that should be right here in America. Each day, we 
send nearly $1 billion of our wealth to foreign countries for their oil. And today, 
as we look to the Gulf, we see an entire way of life being threatened by a 
menacing cloud of black crude. (Obama “BP Address”) 
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Behind many arguments in favor of containing the BP spill is an appeal to a “national 
mission” and the ability for America to “seize control” of its destiny:  
But the one approach I will not accept is inaction. The one answer I will not settle 
for is the idea that this challenge is somehow too big and too difficult to meet. 
You know, the same thing was said about our ability to produce enough planes 
and tanks in World War II. (Obama “BP Address”) 
This call for a national unity is similar to presidential rhetoric during times of war (Hyde 
2-3).  In fact, the military enthymeme, for Obama, is completed with both literal 
references to military conflict and appeals that model war rhetoric. 
Conclusion 
 While there are certainly intricacies in each of Obama’s environmental addresses, 
two consistent themes emerge.  First, the dominant argumentative justification for 
governmental environmental policy is that it will have a positive effect on the economy.  
Two strands of economic benefits are emphasized: competitiveness and job creation.  
Second, national security benefits are prioritized as complimentary to economic benefits.  
There are two approaches Obama uses to frame national security benefits: literal 
descriptions of military security and militarized metaphors representing environmental 
policy. 
 Obama’s rhetorical constructions have changed as his exigencies transformed.  At 
the beginning of Obama’s presidency, his economic references consistently noted 
“700,000” jobs, connoting the energy components of the stimulus package.  During the 
following year, references to the stimulus package were dropped from his rhetorical 
repertoire, and a broader appeal to employment and competitiveness was adopted.  
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Obama’s national security frame also underwent temporal transformation.  While “energy 
independence” from dictators and terrorists was a consistent theme, the addition of 
arguments based in the militarized metaphor occurs only in the last month of the set 
analyzed.  It appears that the BP spill demanded a new rhetorical approach, and Obama 
framed the BP crisis as a siege on our shores, to be met with an equal “fight” and “battle” 
response from the government. 
Equally as important as what Obama said, is what he did not say. In the eighteen 
months, forty speeches and over 63,000 words of Obama’s presidential environmental 
rhetoric, Obama never once used the phrase “global warming” in public address.  Six 
days into his presidency he argued that “rigid ideology has overruled sound science” but 
no robust defense of the science behind global warming has been mentioned since then 
(Obama “Energy Independence”).  To the contrary, in his 2010 State of the Union, 
Obama specifically dodged discussion of the scientific consensus supporting his policy in 
arguing that:  
[E]ven if you doubt the evidence, providing incentives for energy efficiency and 
clean energy are the right thing to do for our future – because the nation that leads 
the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And 
America must be that nation. (Obama “2010 State of the Union”) 
Similarly, Obama chose not to emphasize the risk to the environment, biodiversity or 
species posed by environmental crises.  In the set of speeches analyzed, his only 
reference to “species” comes in a passing reference to the Endangered Species Act.   
Instead, economic and national security benefits are portrayed as independent benefits, 
not associated with the environmental impact of his policies.  
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While Obama often referenced “the environment” it was never a robust 
description, and always coupled with economic and national security benefits.  In the 
seventeen months of environmental public address, the five most commonly used terms 
were: jobs, energy, economy, oil and business.  This word cloud, which represents the 
number of times each word pictured said during this period, depicts the emphasis placed 




The terms “jobs,” “economy” and “businesses” were each used well over three-times as 
frequently as “environment” or “climate.”  Importantly, the use of the term 
“environment” drastically increased during the last two months of the set analyzed, 
largely in response to the BP crisis.  Therefore, “environment” is more largely 
represented in the world cloud than is truly indicative of Obama’s environmental 
strategy.  Removing these two months from the cloud analysis shows that the economic 
terms (jobs, economy and businesses) were used over ten-times as frequently as 
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environmental terms (environment and climate) in Obama’s non-BP environmental 
addresses.  Obama’s choice to use economic and national security concerns as primary 
justifications for environmental policy is a rhetorical strategy developed to make 
environmental policy “pop more” (Mufson and Eiplerin para. 5).  The fourth chapter will 
analyze the possible implications of this rhetorical approach by comparing it to historical 
approaches to environmental policy, and integrating rhetorical theory that provides 





Chapter Four – Analysis and Evaluation 
Introduction 
The possible implications of Obama’s environmental strategy are many fold and 
difficult to deterministically predict.  However, each rhetorical strategy influences the 
audience understanding of both environmental problems and Obama’s proposed 
solutions.  This chapter integrates rhetorical theory with the empirical precedent 
discussed in chapter two to point to the likely influence of Obama’s rhetorical strategies.  
Two findings emerge.  First, Obama’s approach is extremely similar to approaches taken 
by other presidents historically.  Therefore, evaluation of the successes and failures of 
their approaches may provide insight for understanding Obama’s environmentalism.  
This finding of continuity also directly implicates Obama’s ability to apply his narrative 
of “change” to his environmental agenda.  Moreover, since the limited and piecemeal 
environmental policy record of the last eighty years is tied to the choice to represent 
environmental policies in terms of economics and national security, this provides strong 
evidence arguing against Obama’s strategy.  I use corn-based ethanol and Obama’s 
rhetorical approach to green jobs to provide tangible examples of rhetorical framing 
strategies directly implicating the political agenda.  Second, Obama has largely failed to 
exercise rhetorical environmental leadership.  While his framing choices are influential, 
equally instrumental is what was not said.  His lackluster devotion to environmentalist 
arguments for environmental policy makes pursuit of a broader environmental agenda 
that truly promotes sustainability much more difficult. 
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Implications of Obama’s Environmental Justifications 
 On November 4th 2008, Barack Obama was elected by a nearly 10 million popular 
margin and a nearly two-hundred vote electoral college margin on a “mandate of change” 
(Grunwald para. 1, 2).  Obama’s inauguration filled environmentalists with the “hope of 
new beginnings” and ignited a belief that Obama may be the first environmentalist 
president of the 21st century (Chameides para. 1).  Despite this, Obama’s environmental 
rhetoric more closely represents continuity with historical arguments and justifications 
for environmental policy than the rhetorical emplotment of “change.”  Obama, while 
rhetorically purporting both rhetorical and policy change, has actually been quite 
conservative in his environmental approach.  By using economics and national security 
justifications for environmental policy, Obama has not drifted far from the conservative 
tradition of environmental policy (Vickery 123).  Politically, this strategy can be seen as 
pragmatic; however, the policies motivated by this frame continue with the conservative 
tradition of avoiding regulation necessary to protect the environment because of 
arguments that these policies would unnecessarily limit economic growth. 
By not emphasizing the environmentalist justifications for his environmental 
policy, Obama allows other justifications to become “dominant frames.” This rhetorical 
construction makes the environmental impact of his policies (positive or negative) a 
secondary concern: 
When…one frame comes to dominate debate...proponents of the losing 
frame…convert under their old frame.  In this case, they can either adjust their 
rhetoric to the new frame or concede and withdraw from the policy debate.  The 
winning frame can so dominate that others are delegitimized and given no 
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credence in the media and public discourse.  When this occurs the dominant frame 
could be said to be acting hegemonically, rendering ‘natural’ the prevailing 
definition of the situation. (Miller and Riechert 114) 
Therefore, Obama’s repeated reliance on appeals to economic and national security 
creates a dominant perspective that overshadows his brief mention of the environmental 
benefits of his policies (de Vreese 37).  While several public policy scholars (Fletcher 
811; Lehrer & Becker 651; Best 159; de Vreese 36; Shen 374) believe that this focus on 
economics and national security has the benefit of adding salience over key issues for the 
public, there are unforseen disadvantages to this approach as well.  In order to address the 
critical problem of determining the function of national security rhetoric used to justify 
environmental policy, Zarefsky’s theories of definition provide clarity. 
 Each of Obama’s rhetorical justifications for environmental policy acts to define 
both Obama’s environmental policy and environmental decline in the mind of the public.  
By using specific justifications for the environment, Obama “makes visible what had 
been invisible” (Zarefsky “Definitions” 2).  In this way, Obama’s justifications give 
greater presence to the specific arguments he uses, and, therefore, dissociates the 
justifications for environmental policy that were not emphasized.  Rhetorical 
justifications are “not neutral” or purely additive; rather, each justification acts as both a 
“selection and a deflection of reality” (Burke 45).  Thus, any rhetorical construction is 
inherently limiting of other alternative constructions.  In a practical sense, this may help 
explain why Obama’s environmental arguments are sidelined (even when he does 
mention them) because of more salient justifications of economics and national security: 
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“a definition of the situation commands wide adherence and hegemonically excludes 
alternative frames of reference” (Zarefsky “Definitions” 7). 
 One place to determine the possible effects of Obama’s environmental 
justifications can be found in a close look at Bitzer’s discussion of exigence and audience 
constraints.  The rhetorical exigence is “an imperfection marked by urgency” where 
“positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse” (Bitzer 6,7).  In 
the context of Obama’s environmental policy, there are multiple, yet contradictory or 
conflicting exigencies.  For example, environmental pollution is clearly an exigence that 
“strongly invites the assistance of the discourse producing public awareness, indignation, 
and action of the right kind” (Bitzer 7).  Yet, other exigences persist as well.  Obama, by 
choosing to emphasize certain justifications in his environmental addresses, is responding 
to the lack of public motivation, economic stagnation, political gridlock and anti-
environmental interest groups.  Therefore, his response is not entirely “environmental”; 
thus, is inconsistent with the ideal goals of the environmental movement.  Obama’s 
“controlling exigence” is likely the difficulty in achieving the balance between politically 
viable environmental policy and regulations that are strong enough to have a positive 
impact on the environment (Bitzer 7).  In contrast, purely environmental advocates 
support a more idealistic view of environmental policy that, even if politically difficult, is 
worth significant short-term costs given the magnitude of the impact of environmental 
decline.   
 Invoking the non-environmental frames of economics and national security 
carries both associations and dissociations (Zarefksy “Definitions” 8).  Associated with 
national and economic security is a feeling of military might, human strength and safety.  
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However, emphasizing national and economic security dissociates alternative explanatory 
frames (Zarefsky “Definitions” 8).  Thus, the audience dissociates environmentalism 
from environmental policy because the argument is excluded by definition (Zarefsky 
“Definitions” 8).  The frame created, even if done in common interest with 
environmentalism, influences “social formations” and public opinion towards 
environmental policy (Zarefksy “Definitions” 10).  This dissociation surely is not 
deterministic, and is more usefully thought of on a continuum.  For example, choosing to 
justify environmental policy solely in terms of economic arguments would lead to 
policies that place economics as the only concern – completely disregarding 
environmentalism.  However, Obama’s passing references to environmentalism likely 
produce a political situation where environmentalism is a secondary (possibly tertiary or 
quaternary) concern, but a concern nonetheless. 
Economic Justifications 
The historical precedent of piecemeal, negotiated and compromised 
environmental policy provides an ambivalent foreground for Obama’s choice to use 
economic prosperity as the primary justification for his environmental policy.  While 
each presidential rhetorical situation is unique, the historic economic theme surely has 
significant costs as well as potential benefits that are true for Obama’s political advocacy 
as well.  The economic frame has been somewhat effective at motivating a public to 
support environmental policy.  Both Roosevelt and Kennedy, who are widely accepted as 
successful environmental presidents, used the economic frame to motivate 
environmentalism and translated that public support into policy.  There are two reasons 
why the economic frame may prove useful for Obama.   
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First, economic prosperity and job creation are extremely salient issues for large 
portions of the population.  Therefore, appealing to the public’s motivations with 
economic justifications may produce an increase in public support and provide a sense of 
immediate relevance to the audience (de Vreese 36).  Economic justifications are 
particularly salient because they tie macrosocial issues (economic growth) to 
microindividual actions (support for environmental policy) (Shen 374).  This is especially 
true in times of limited growth and unemployment, which is exemplified by the Pew 
polling noted in the first chapter.  Every president of the last eighty years has framed 
environmental policy in positive-sum terms with economic growth.  Given that 
traditionally, “economics and the environment are considered antagonists,” presidents 
have shown how political gains can successfully promote prosperity and job creation, 
while simultaneously protecting the environment (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 276).   
Second, the economic justification emphasizes the importance of technological 
innovation as a necessary tool for limiting environmental degradation.  Green energy is at 
the forefront of environmental solutions in the developed world, and the benefits of 
technological optimism provide some hope for environmental sustainability (Carcasson 
“Global Gridlock” 276).  For contemporary presidents, the choice to reframe 
environmental regulation as an avenue of promoting technological innovation often 
offsets opponents’ arguments concerning economic cost (Fletcher 811).  Technological 
advancement can be argued even more effectively when combined with patriotic appeals 
illustrating innovation as a way for America to get ahead.  This rhetorical frame is seen in 
both Johnson’s and Kennedy’s rhetoric, where they use of the trope of American 
exceptionalism as motivation for environmental solutions.  Such approaches appeal to the 
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myth of America as a “chosen people” who may also profit by disseminating this 
technology on a global level (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 280).   
These benefits should not be overlooked or dismissed.  Clearly, environmentalism 
has progressed in the last eighty years – achieving both legislative and administrative 
successes.  Many of these accomplishments are likely associated with the president’s 
ability to motivate the public through economic justifications for environmental policy; 
however: “the economic frame…is not likely to be sufficient in the long run and on a 
large enough scale” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 270).  Therefore, evaluating the 
possible disadvantages of the economic justification is necessary. 
There are three disadvantages to using economics as the primary justification for 
environmental policy.  First, prioritizing economic justifications ensures that 
environmental concerns remain “conceptualized as low-priority luxury items to be 
brushed aside when the economy falters” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 276).  Since 
economic performance is often subjective and uncertain, “a politician would always be 
able to find some distressing signs of economic trouble to justify reducing environmental 
activism, as George W. Bush has demonstrated” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 276). A 
March 2009 Gallup poll found that:  
For the first time in Gallup’s 25-year history of asking Americans about the trade-
off between environmental protection and economic growth, a majority of 
Americans say economic growth should be given the priority, even if the 
environment suffers to some extent… The reason for this shift in priorities almost 
certainly has to do with the current economic recession. The findings reflect many 
recent Gallup results showing how primary the economy is in Americans' minds, 
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and help document the fact of life that in times of economic stress, the public can 
be persuaded to put off or ignore environmental concerns if need be in order to 
rejuvenate the economy. (Newport “Economy takes precedence” para. 1-3) 
Over half of Americans support uncurbed economic growth, even at the expense of the 
environment – a truly frightening trend for environmental advocates. 
 This decline in public support for growth-limiting environmental policy is 
mirrored in an overall decline in public environmentalism.  For the first sixteen months of 
the Obama presidency, the public saw no urgent environmental exigence, since the public 
failed to understand the pressing nature of species loss and global warming.  A poll taken 
at the beginning of the Obama administration indicates that less than one percent of the 
population believed that global warming and environmental decline were the most 
pressing problems for the Obama administration (Washington Post q. 7).  Surprisingly, 
the public became even more apathetic to environmentalism throughout Obama’s first 
year as president.  A 2009 Pew poll indicated a sharp decline of over 15 percent from 
2008 to late 2009 of individuals that believed there was “solid evidence the earth is 
warming” (Newport “Economy takes precedence” para. 1,2).  For those who did support 
the global warming hypothesis, there was a nine percent drop, during Obama’s first year 
as president, in those that believed it was a “serious problem” (Newport “Economy takes 
precedence” table 1).  A March 2010 Gallup poll reflects a similar public sentiment: 
[R]esults show that the reversal in Americans' concerns about global warming that 
began last year has continued in 2010 -- in some cases reverting to the levels 
recorded when Gallup began tracking global warming measures more than a 
decade ago.  For example, the percentage of Americans who now say reports of 
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global warming are generally exaggerated is by a significant margin the highest 
such reading in the 13-year history of asking the question. In 1997, 31% said 
global warming's effects had been exaggerated; last year, 41% said the same, and 
this year the number is 48%. (Newport “Global warming concerns” para. 3) 
During the first fifteen months of the administration, Obama’s rhetorical strategy did not 
lead to a shift in public opinion in favor of his policies, and failed to overcome other 
exigencies that were limiting public environmentalist sentiment. 
 The decline in public support for strict environmental policy may prove damning 
for any legislative gains, because, absent public support, overcoming special interest 
groups and big business opposition is much more difficult.  A change in public opinion in 
favor of environmental policy is crucial:  
The mere expression of support by the public in a scientific survey or an opinion 
poll (as are often conducted by local newspapers and politicians) can also be a 
vital resource of the social movement…Supportive public opinion thus not only 
lends legitimacy to a social movement but it provides a valuable resource in 
lobbying for new legislation or pressing for the effective implementation of 
existing legislation. (Dunlap 89-90) 
Therefore, a shift in public opinion is often the precursor to a similar shift in 
representative components of governments. 
Second, the economic justification for environmental policy ensures that any 
environmental policy that limits growth, or can be negatively portrayed as limiting 
growth, will fail.  Economic prioritization creates a policy environment in which positive 
incentives and voluntary measures become the only possible approach, because 
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regulations may impose “unnecessary” costs on businesses.  Environmental and 
rhetorical scholars have described this rhetorical frame and resulting problems as the “we 
can have it all theme” that “works to meld environmental quality with economic 
prosperity” (Cannon and Riehl 222, 226).  Most certainly, this strategy is politically 
motivated: 
'We can have it all' is an attractive theme for presidents because it allows them to 
declare a win-win on environmental issues. No interest has to suffer, and therefore 
no constituency need be disappointed. The theme also has roots in the way the 
public actually thinks or wants to think, about the environment. (Cannon and 
Riehl 228) 
However, every new regulation imposes some cost, because of the inherent tradeoffs 
associated with government resource allocation; thus, regulation cannot win in a debate 
where the largest value-concern is economics.  In this way, Obama let the external 
economic situation act as a limiting variable that allowed the situation to dictate 
rhetorical strategy, instead of developing a strategy that influenced and controlled the 
rhetorical construction of the situation.  
To be sure, Obama had some limited administrative successes in the 
environmental arena in his first seventeen months in office.  In March 2009, Obama 
signed the Omnibus Public Lands Management Act that set aside two million acres of 
public land as protected wilderness.  In May 2009, Obama issued an executive order that 
committed the federal government to restoring health of the Chesapeake Bay.  However, 
landmark global warming legislation and strict regulations on greenhouse gas pollution 
were out of reach.  Noticeably missing from Obama’s environmental successes from the 
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first seventeen months are policies that would limit pollution or substantially regulate 
industry.  When these policies have been enacted, often times they have been coupled 
with massive industry-focused tax breaks, or subsidies for non-renewable energies.  
Absent widespread public support, getting Congress on board for legislation that was 
portrayed as economically constraining and anti-business was not likely.  While it is 
difficult to tie public opinion directly to Obama’s rhetorical choices, understanding the 
historical precedent surrounding presidential environmental rhetoric may provide 
divination into the Obama’s ability to motivate public opinion in favor of his 
environmental policy (Daynes and Sussman 238).  
While presidents since Roosevelt have rhetorically constructed a positive-sum 
relationship between environmental sustainability and economics, new evidence is 
supporting the opposite argument – that humanity cannot economically “grow itself” out 
of the environmental crisis.  James Speth, the Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies, makes a compelling case that the drive for unrestrained and 
unlimited economic growth is the root cause of environmental decline on a global scale:  
But the much larger and more threatening impacts stem from the economic 
activity of those of us participating in the modern, increasingly prosperous world 
economy. This activity is consuming vast quantities of resources from the 
environment and returning to the environment vast quantities of waste products. 
The damages are already huge and are on a path to be ruinous in the future… An 
unquestioning society-wide commitment to economic growth at almost any cost; 
enormous investment in technologies designed with little regard for the 
environment; powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is to grow 
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by generating profit, including profit from avoiding the environmental costs they 
create; markets that systematically fail to recognize environmental costs unless 
corrected by government; government that is subservient to corporate interests 
and the growth imperative; rampant consumerism spurred by a worshipping of 
novelty and by sophisticated advertising; economic activity so large in scale that 
its impacts alter the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet—all 
combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is undermining the 
planet’s ability to sustain life. (7-8) 
A research group at Schumacher College has reached similar conclusions.  While 
economic growth combined with regulation may eventually slow the rate of 
environmental decline, only a less consumptive economy in the developed world is 
capable of preventing the worst effects of global warming and biodiversity loss (66).  
Environmental regulation that slows the least restrained components of the economy – 
mass consumption and the plundering of the environment by multinational corporations – 
is necessary, but current economic justifications for environmental policy make it 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Obama’s rhetorical plea for “green jobs” is a tangible example of the failure of 
environmentalism supported primarily by arguments for economic prosperity and job 
growth.  The Democrats’ focus on green jobs has distracted from a broader 
comprehensive reform because piecemeal gains in the labor arena have been depicted and 
accepted as sufficient (T. Johnson para. 6).  Moreover, the Labor Department has 
developed an extremely broad definition of “green jobs” that allows virtually any job to 
be defined as environmentally beneficial.  Thus, stimulus money designated to 
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legitimately green jobs has been diverted to environmentally harmful companies, largely 
because the justification for such funding was based on economic arguments instead of 
environmentalism for the sake of the environment (York para. 10). 
 Third, Obama’s choice to emphasize the “competitiveness” benefit of 
environmental policy is a frame easily co-opted by anti-environmentalist factions.  Less 
than a decade ago, George W. Bush used the exact same justification to oppose signing 
the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that it would unfairly hinder the competitiveness of 
businesses inside of the United States.  Once again, any regulation that could hinder 
United States industrial competitiveness is discarded because of the undying faith in the 
competitive free market to solve environmental problems (Fougner 166).    
The competitiveness frame also prioritizes national environmental policy over 
international agreements.  Analogizing environmental policy to an international race to a 
finish line of technological superiority manifests policies of economic nationalism that 
serves to inhibit international environmentalism: 
Playing into the self-deprecating sense of doom that has pervaded American 
society in the face of Asia's recent challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, such a 
narrative is likely to register much more powerfully with an increasingly cynical 
electorate than the environmentalist 'politics of limits'.  What most commentators 
fail to appreciate, however, is that this renewed focus on growth and 
competitiveness is not only misleading the American public, it also poses a 
profound threat to the world economy and the billions of people who are still 
struggling to make their way out of poverty. The specter of economic nationalism 
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looms large behind the desperate attempt to reframe the climate crisis in terms of 
innovation and competiveness. (Roos para. 1,2) 
Global warming and environmental decline are transnational concerns that cannot be 
addressed by just the developed world – much less just the United States (Lynas 194).  
The continual emphasis of national competitiveness and relative prosperity discourages 
international cooperation that is a prerequisite to effective environmental policy. 
 Finally, the economic justification is constraining because the successes and 
failures of environmental policy must be measured based on its impact on future 
generations.  Since the economic justification privileges the here-and-now of the public’s 
pocketbook, large future gains are not considered nearly as attractive when compared to 
minimal short-term losses.  Therefore, a more plural approach in the debate about 
environmental values may be the best approach to overcome status quo polarization over 
the economic impact of environmental policy.   
National Security Justifications 
The historical uses of literal and metaphorical national security justifications for 
environmental policy similarly intersect with Obama’s presidential environmental 
rhetoric.  This empirical foreground provides significant insight into the costs and 
benefits associated with the rhetorical approach based on national security justifications.    
National security justifications appeal to a shared understanding of common well being 
that has historically silenced democratic dissent.  Thus, the “cultural resonance” of 
national security arguments is much greater than environmental justifications alone 
(Lehrer & Becker 651).  Since no one can “come out against national security,” 
opponents of environmental policy based on environmental concerns are portrayed as 
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treasonous and dangerous (Lehrer 155).  Therefore, since the debate shifts from no longer 
being about environmental policy for the sake of environmentalism, the possibilities for 
error replication and poor policy choices arise.  Similar concerns arise from the use of the 
military metaphor to describe the governmental response to social ills. 
 However, there is a benefit of added political saliency provided by national 
security justifications for environmental policy.  If an environmental policy is good for 
the environment, environmental justifications alone do not necessarily ensure that 
Congress or the public will be persuaded on environmental terms alone.  Therefore, even 
beneficial environmental policy may need the influential boost of non-environmental 
justifications to motivate public and congressional opinion.  National security 
justifications may rally congressional support in favor of environmental policy, at least in 
the short-term: “policymakers come to favor dramatic gestures, such as declaring war.  
Social policy, like social problems, attracts attention when it seems new and dramatic; 
otherwise it gets ignored” (Best 159).  The media is more likely to latch onto and 
replicate grandiose and seductive fear appeals than bland descriptions of environmental 
decline.  In this way, militarization makes the complex issue of environmental 
sustainability easy to understand.  For, the general public is left to wonder: why question 
the existence of the problem or the efficacy of the solution if the mere act of question 
may be conceived as treason in wartime?  
 Jonathan Simon, a professor of Law at Berkeley, in response to Obama’s Oil Spill 
address, argued that the virtues of employing the war metaphor are really just the “flip 
side” of the vices (“Governing Through War” para. 8).   Just as the metaphor has the 
potential to “unify[] a potentially very divided nation,” it also “brings some nasty features 
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including intolerance, excess, tunnel vision, and a general aggrandizement of power and 
authority” (para. 4, 8).  The advantages and disadvantages of such an approach are surely 
unpredictable, which in the context of the environment is extremely risky. 
There are two risks associated with national security justifications.  First, learning 
from the lessons provided by the war on poverty, there is a risk that these short-term 
gains will short-circuit broader reform.  Once the original gains are represented as 
successes in the popular media, public support may unexpectedly decline.  Second, taking 
cue from the war on drugs and the war on crime, creating politically unquestionable 
programs is only beneficial if such policies are in fact benign.  This is a significant risk 
given unexpected consequences and negative externalities associated with the enactment 
of national security inspired social policy.  While the rhetorical decision to emphasize 
national security benefits, while avoiding the debate about climate change, made it 
possible for even the political far right to support Obama’s policies, it also discarded the 
environmental impact of his environmental policy.  This frame helped corn-based ethanol 
receive widespread support because of its influence on oil dependence and national 
security.  Moreover, this approach avoided the debate about the negative environmental 
impact of monocropping corn across Midwest America. 
 The ethanol boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s was a political boon for both 
Clinton and George W. Bush.  Ethanol had the advantages of being produced in the 
politically important agricultural Midwest and was rhetorically framed to appeal to the 
public’s national security concerns.  Clinton supported both the tax credit and the federal 
excise tax exemption at the pump; and, argued that: [e]thanol production…reduces 
American reliance on foreign oil (Hagel “Senate Debate”).  George H.W. Bush, while 
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generally holding virtually opposite environmental views, also avidly supported corn-
based ethanol, stating that: “renewable fuels are gentle on the environment, and they are 
made in America so they cannot be threatened by any foreign power” (Hagel “Senate 
Debate”).  With the Renewables Fuels Mandates of 2005 and 2007, government support 
jumpstarted 124 new ethanol plants, with “most located in corn-growing states” (Graham 
151). 
 This support continued into the Obama administration when in October of 2009 
Obama stated the importance of developing biofuels for both economic and national 
security gains (Obama “Solar Energy Center”).  Four months later, Obama increased the 
Congressional mandate for corn-based ethanol by over two billion gallons (Fahey para. 
3).  While this mandate also included new incentives for second-generation cellulosic 
ethanol, the new incentives for corn made it extremely difficult for other renewable 
sources to compete.  The newest environmental studies indicate that ethanol has 
devastated United States farm land sustainability, increased emissions that contribute to 
climate change and likely increased United States’ oil dependence; however government 
mandates ensure that “corn would play an increasing role in crop rotations” into the 
future (Lehrer 165). 
Why did public and political support continue for an energy source that, as early 
as 1997, was understood to have largely negative effects on both oil consumption and the 
environment (Moore para. 6-8)?  Biofuels were popular largely because arguments 
supporting national security justifications “became a strong rhetorical device for 
supporting biofuels development” that “overshadowed the rhetorical power” of other 
dissenting arguments (Lehrer 151).  Despite the fact that there were “real and concrete” 
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differences among environmentalists over the effectiveness of corn-based ethanol, the 
“shared national security discourses helped create a sense of commonality among their 
perspectives” (Lehrer 151).   
Corn ethanol supporters used national security justifications during the debate 
over the Farm Bill of 2008.  While the Farm Bill debate was originally focused on 
commodity reform that would substantially limit domestic subsidies for large agricultural 
interests, it resulted in an increase in agricultural payments for corn ethanol.  This turn 
occurred largely because “stakeholder consensus on the benefits of biofuels” silenced the 
debate about their poor environmental effect and limited influence on oil dependence 
(Lehrer and Becker 651).  These appeals worked to “tip the scales” in favor of “the more 
historically embedded farm bill players” (Lehrer and Becker 651). 
Patriotic discourses, both economic and security-based, “were in fact a more 
powerful driver of biofuels’ influence on farm and energy policies than the substantive 
benefits of the biofuels themselves” (Lehrer 151).  Thus, the debate about environmental 
policy shifted to a debate about national security and energy, which allowed powerful 
interest groups whose interests were non-environmental, or even anti-environmental, to 
control the discourse of the debate (Lehrer 152).  Thus, any ethanol dissenter was 
immediately silenced by the hegemonic discourse of national security (Lukes 30).  
Absent a debate solely on the grounds of environmental sustainability, environmental 
policy risks cooptation that may worsen the state of the environment.  In this way, 
ethanol acts as a representative anecdote for possible future policy failure in the 
environmental arena. 
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The permutation of justifications for environmental policy reliant upon national 
security, war metaphor and economic nationalism is particularly dangerous.  Not only 
does it risk policy failure and environmental harm, but also it creates the possibility for 
literalization of the metaphor and actual violence in the name of the “war against 
extinction” (Oskamp 180). 
 The twentieth century’s laundry list of failed wars on social ills provides a 
cautionary tale for Obama’s rhetorical choices.  Naming a societal concern an “enemy” 
and declaring even metaphorical war against it risks unforeseen negative consequences.  
Creating a “battle plan” against the oil industry may seem a necessity in the immediate 
aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, and certainly has short-term rhetorical advantages; 
however, the “fight” may not end with the mere metaphorical representation of violence.   
The lesson learned from the wars on crime, poverty and drugs shows that there is 
a significant risk of the military metaphor actualizing itself in violence.  This risk is 
magnified in times of economic crisis (Roos para. 16).  Similar to the war on crime, a 
metaphorical war against pollution will create a divided populous – the citizens being 
those that support the war through environmentally friendly solutions and polluters 
identified as non-citizens.  In the war on crime and war on drugs, the enemy was easily 
identified by the color of their skin; in the war for the environment, the enemy may be 
identified by automobile choice, whether a family chooses to recycle or by visible 
industrial pollution. 
Historical data should be troubling to those advocating the use of the war 
metaphor within the environmental movement.  Using the metaphor of war has created a 
dangerous ambiguity that legitimated violence: “a war on, say, drugs (or, more 
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commonly, drug users, or drug sellers) can be fought with the tactics and with the logic of 
a traditional war, while defended when pressed and when convenient, as merely a 
metaphor…it can either be a literal or a metaphoric claim…” (Elkins 7).  Thus, the 
military metaphor created the conditions for arbitrary violence and limited the democratic 
checks on that conflict; “The U.S. has long used “war on” metaphors to identify suitable 
enemies and justify extreme security measures against them: “the war on crime,” “the 
war on drugs,” and even “the war on poverty”…” are the most immediately relevant 
examples of the militarization of campaigns against social ills (Amore and Gooede 61). 
The prospect for violence in the name of the environment does not end at 
individual or domestic conflicts.  Given the close connections between environmental 
collapse and international security threats, avoiding militarization of the environmental 
movement is necessary to avoid pre-emptive conflict against environmental polluters.  
The war on drugs provides a telling example of how war against a domestic social ill can 
turn into foreign military adventurism.  For example, the United States may view a 
developing nation as a risk to the success of the war for the environment and use pre-
emptive military force to prevent that country from further polluting.  James R. Lee, a 
professor at American University and the head of American University’s University's 
Inventory of Conflict and Environment project concludes that:  
[C]limate change can be a justification for a preventative war in at least three 
ways. First, it can be a reason to stop another country from taking harmful 
environmental actions that impact another, such as pollution that can cross 
borders. Second, it might be used to prevent countries from depriving others of 
their fair share of environmental resources (such as water in clouds). Third, some 
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may resort to it in order to acquire basic resources such as food, when state 
survival or a humanitarian catastrophe looms (160). 
Given the high risk of military miscalculation, adding more stressors to international 
relationships should certainly be avoided. 
Similar to militarized social movements of the past, those in support of violence 
within the environment movement will label these conflicts “just wars.”   However, once 
a war against a developing nation is considered “just” it’s difficult to prevent conflict 
against almost every major power, and this rhetorical choice would certainly justify 
violence against the United States in the name of the environment.  These wars would 
have a severe impact on the environment and divert money and attention away from 
preventing environmental catastrophe.  Thus, violent representations that risk literal 
violence are certainly not warranted. 
National security justifications for environmental policy carry many of the same 
risks associated with prioritizing economic justifications.  Both justifications sideline 
environmental arguments as tertiary to nationalistic and patriotic concerns.  The 
permutation of the national security and economic justifications is especially dangerous – 
economic nationalism, juxtaposed to threats to national security, risks a literalization of 
violence in the name of the environment qua national security.  These primary 
justifications have made strong, effective environmental policy more difficult to achieve, 
and the continued construction of environmentalism in terms of economics and national 
security risks unpredictable negative results. 
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What Obama Didn’t Say 
While there are costs and benefits associated with the economic and national 
security frames, the larger concern is that these frames have become dominant, and 
served to implicitly disregard the environmental arguments for environmental policy. 
Presidential environmental justifications of the last eighty years have been limited due to 
a “misdiagnosis of [the] rhetorical situation” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 282).  
Presidents since Roosevelt have identified salient political issues – economic prosperity 
and national security – and crafted rhetorical strategies to appeal to those desires.  
However, these rhetorical choices have constrained presidential policymaking so severely 
that presidents have been forced to place legislation that would have a meaningful effect 
on the backburner.  Even worse, the dominant frame of national and economic security 
has created policy failures by sidestepping the debate about environmental impact: 
“[w]hether the dominant frames are adjusted with the current function systems or whether 
alternative function systems are brought into the mix, to overcome the current gridlock a 
significant rhetorical transformation will clearly be necessary” (Carcasson “Global 
Gridlock” 281).  Specifically, there are three, potentially motivating, arguments that 
Obama has avoided. To be clear, no other frame will be as immediately politically 
salient, as jobs and economic security rank at the top of the public’s concerns at the end 
of 2010.  Despite this constraint: 
The U.S. president, more than any other political figure, can serve the role of 
moral leader and mythmaker, and this type of narrative could work to re-create 
the discourse surrounding the global environment, overcoming may of the current 
constraints.  (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 281) 
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Thus, a reframing holds significant potential for motivating environmentalism into the 
21st century. 
First, Obama has not taken the role of educator.  Except for passing references 
from Obama, the scientific debate about global warming has been infiltrated by media 
punditry.  Second, Obama has failed to emphasize the global nature of the problem and 
the necessity of moral leadership from the United States.  This appeal may effectively 
appeal to the myth of “civil religion” that has motivated public support for social policy 
since the foundation of the United States.  Finally, Obama has avoided noting the 
interdependence of environmental decline with economics and national security.  Instead, 
Obama has argued for separate benefits not associated with the environment (e.g. farm 
land values, oil dependence, American competitiveness), while ignoring that 
environmental sustainability is foundational to the economic and national security 
benefits that Americans value most. 
Several environmental scholars have argued against the use of scientific 
justifications to support environmental policy.  Carcasson argues that since science has 
inherent subjectivities and is based on unpredictable variables, those opposing 
environmental policy can always point to other “scientific” data to support their 
arguments (“Global Gridlock” 277).  Sarewit and Pielke argue that since individuals 
experience variable weather patterns then their immediate experience will contradict, and 
thus override, scientific musings (5).  However, these scholars’ reticence towards science 
is misguided on two accounts.  First, since environmental presidents have largely avoided 
the scientific debate about global warming.  In doing so, they have ceded the discussion 
to the “countermovement opposing the efforts of the environmental movement” 
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(McWright and Dunlap 499).  Conservative politicians, think tanks and internet-bloggers 
are leading the charge in the discussion of climate change science, which devastates 
liberal justifications for progressive environmental policy in name of the environment.  
Second, no president has yet made scientific justifications for environmental policy a 
priority.  There are only two references to science in the first seventeen months of 
Obama’s administration.  Both are dismissively passive and fail to represent the scientific 
consensus in support of human-induced climate change.   Therefore, arguments about the 
failure of the scientific justification are really a straw-person.  Of course, the scientific 
frame has thus far failed for environmentalist presidents, because they have chosen not to 
participate in the debate at all. 
The fact that climate chance science has reached consensus should make the 
president’s rhetorical job much easier.  As noted in the first chapter, the most in-depth 
survey of peer-reviewed scientific articles concerning climate change found not a single 
one that doubted the fundamental assumptions that climate change was happening, 
human induced, and a large threat to humanity (Hendricks and Inslee 7).  A 2010 report 
from the Environmental Protection Agency looked at twenty-two indicators of climate 
change (e.g. emissions, atmospheric energy, precipitation, cyclone intensity, etc.) and 
found “indisputable evidence” to support the basic tenants of the global warming 
hypothesis (1).   
In similar vein, Obama’s first seventeen months of rhetorical environmentalism 
has posited the governmental response as action against climate change, not action 
against global warming.  This distinction may seem minor, but Obama’s choice 
preference “climate change” rhetoric over “global warming” is problematic: 
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[R]esearch has shown that choice of terminology affects how the public 
understands and evaluates the issue. ‘Global warming’ is more often believed to 
have human causes and tends to be associated with ozone depletion, the 
greenhouse effect and heat-related impacts, such as temperature increase and 
melting icebergs and glaciers. The term ‘climate change’ is more readily 
associated with natural causes and a range of impacts. Furthermore, the term 
‘global warming’ evokes significantly more concern, and is rated as ‘very 
important’ by more respondents, than the term ‘climate change.’ Finally, more 
people consider individual or public action to be an effective means of tackling 
‘global warming’ than do so for ‘climate change.’ (Whitmarsh 417) 
Obama’s motivation for avoiding the trope of “global warming” has not been made 
publicly available; but, if the choice were related to avoiding the scientific debate, 
invigoration of the scientific frame would absolve him of this concern. 
While there are uncertainties, subjectivities and difficulties in explaining the 
complicated scientific concepts, avoiding this debate has been at the peril of presidential 
environmental agendas.  Conservative think tanks, pundits and politicians have defeated 
the best tool environmentalists have at their disposal: truth.  The need to redefine the 
terms of the debate is clear, and science should be at the forefront of the president’s re-
education of the public motivations for environmentalism. 
Second, Obama has not emphasized the global nature of the environmental 
problem and the necessity of moral leadership from the United States.  Instead, when 
speaking in front of a domestic audience, he has framed environmental decline in mostly 
domestic terms, and argued for mostly domestic solutions.  Asking the United States to 
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unilaterally sacrifice prosperity or security in the name of the international community 
may be an unachievable goal, but “the rhetorical appeal of American civil 
religion...seems to have remarkable staying power and could be tapped to confront these 
global issues” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 280).  Instead of framing economic policy 
as a “race” or “competition,” where all gains are zero-sum and nationalistic, arguing for 
United States’ leadership against a common global enemy may “tap into many of the 
traditional American myths” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 280).  Practically, this would 
mean working communally to solve international environmental problems, instead of 
trying to be the most economically competitive nation.  While this frame may run counter 
to notions of individualism and consumerism, it may be the pre-requisite to an effective 
international solution.  Successfully employed, this rhetorical appeal would motivate the 
United States to lead international campaigns like the Kyoto Protocol or the Copenhagen 
Climate Summit, instead of impeding progressive environmentalism. 
Richard Pierard and Robert Linder provide a historical discussion of the success 
of the “civil religion” presidential mythos.  They argue that, despite the entelechial risks: 
The president played a central role in [civil religion].  The core belief was that the 
United States was a chosen nation, whose divinely appointed responsibility was to 
be a model before all the world of the benefits of right religion, individual liberty, 
and political democracy.  Under the benevolent, superintending hand of the 
Almighty, its people were to practice patriotism and alleviate ills within their on 
society.  When the nation failed to live up to its calling, prophetic leaders would 
invoke the transcendent power to call it to repentance and return to the paths of 
the righteousness. (284) 
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The appeal of civil religion is not necessarily sacred; it instead may draw from the secular 
mythos of “American exceptionalism” (Carcasson “Global Gridlock” 280).  In the 
context of a global environmental decline, avoiding this frame has limited the depiction 
of the United States’ response to a national one and prevented the discussion of global 
environmental policies.  
Finally, Obama has failed to emphasize the economic and national security 
consequences that will result from global warming and environmental decline.  The 
premise that economics and national security are the most salient issues with the public is 
well documented, and poses a strong exigence for a non-economic policy.  Despite this, 
Obama has emphasized the independence of economics, environmentalism and national 
security, instead of interdependence:  
The interdependence structure frames decision making in terms of mutually 
agreeable principles of coordinated action that may allow people with different 
and often opposed value perspectives to address reciprocally related practical 
problems of respective concern to them…Principles of coordinated action become 
optimal foci for situated judgment whenever those who embrace different value 
perspectives need each other’s cooperation to make progress toward resolving 
practical problems of respective concern to them or otherwise face the prospect of 
practical paralysis and inaction. (Prelli 245) 
A presidential emphasis on the economic and national security impacts of climate change 
and biodiversity loss would allow even disparate political groups to coalesce around the 
issue of environmental protection.  This is distinct from the criticisms leveled earlier in 
this chapter because, in this frame, economic and national security justifications are 
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derivative of environmental protection; therefore, environmental sustainability is the core 
concern while economics and national security are secondary benefits.   
Practically, the a priori focus on environmentalism, with added benefits of 
economic prosperity and national security, would not justify widespread support for corn-
based ethanol, or green jobs simply for the sake of boosting employment, because social 
interest groups would evaluate the negative environmental impact as interdependently 
harmful to their core concerns – economics and national security.  Moreover, more 
significant (costly) environmental regulation would become acceptable in this frame 
because the economic impact of environmental decline would enter the cost-benefit 
equation. 
 Making the case for interdependence between environmental decline and national 
security should not be difficult for Obama.  Without widespread individual and 
governmental transformation, humanity risks overshooting an invisible tipping point that 
makes non-traditional security threats exponentially more dangerous (Speth 26).  The 
decline in biodiversity will likely cause literal wars over both resource shortage and 
abundance.  For example, India and Pakistan, two nuclear states, may risk conflict over 
dwindling water or food supplies as precipitation patterns change and the Indus river 
dries up (Dyer 20).  Russia and the United States, with over ninety percent of the world’s 
nuclear weapons, are in a race to secure for themselves abundant oil supplies underneath 
the melting arctic (Lee 6).  Even absent these great power conflicts, there are other 
security concerns as well.  Once positive feedbacks induce runaway global warming there 
will be a rapid shift to unregulated nuclear power, which will increase the risk of nuclear 
proliferation (Dyer 60). Mass human migration will occur as current agricultural hotspots 
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become arid.  This will place increased economic strain on already fragile governments in 
developing countries, and risks a wave of failed states.  Therefore, biodiversity loss and 
environmental collapse poses both economic and national security risks.  Surely the 
public could be persuaded by these logical and scientifically supported arguments. 
 This strategy is most likely to succeed if presidents rhetorically tie economic and 
security threats to environmental decline, and not discuss them independent of any 
reference to sustainable environmentalism.  While economic and national security 
justifications for environmentalism appeal to salient public concerns, this strategy may 
falter because it is difficult to make visible and personal the effects of environmental 
decline.  Therefore, an additional justification – public health – may help Obama 
personalize environmental decline in the same way Silent Spring was foundational to the 
first wave of public environmentalism (Stevenson 51-52).  The president’s ability to point 
specifically to health risks posed by “byproducts of industrial production” may prove to 
be “an effective catalyst for initiating debate on environmental issues” (Stevenson 52, 
51).  This new frame appeals to salient political issues, economic security and 
personalizes the impact of industrial pollution to the public; however, Obama’s current 
approach of economics and national security at all costs limits the ability for this 
alternative frame to reverberate. 
Strengths and Limitations of Study 
 This study offers an analysis of the historical effectiveness of economic and 
national security justifications for social policy.  While there is no formula or method for 
creating or interpreting universally effective rhetoric, attention should be paid to 
historical effectiveness for developing rhetoric that is influential to a particular audience.  
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Understanding presidential environmental rhetoric through frames of social discourse 
provides the critic with a tool to compare the interrelationship of a plethora of different 
environmental justifications.  Therefore, this method is effective at understanding the 
way political advocacy is received by, and thus influences, the audience; thus, is 
necessary for effective policy analysis.  The specific methods of rhetorical analysis 
employed drew from several different rhetorical theories (frame analysis, thematic 
criticism, definition, etc.); therefore, the analysis emerged from immediately relevant 
theories, instead of relying on a formalistic singular method approach.  While this may 
seem methodologically haphazard, each method used had a common theme: the ability to 
help the critic understand how rhetoric functions to influence an audience. 
 However, this study has limitations.  First, this study is only a limited view of the 
world of environmental policy; therefore, it only provides politically useful advice when 
combined with other research.  For example, this study overlooks entrenched political 
interest groups, constituencies and financial barriers that stand in the way of 
environmental policy.  While rhetorical strategies can be powerful, they may not be a 
panacea for decades of constraints on progressive environmental policy.  Moreover, 
while the president generally has the ability to shape public opinion, public disdain for 
the government during the Obama administration is at an all time high.  Public backlash 
to Obama’s health care plan may signal the political cost associated with investing 
political capital in a socially liberal policy during times of economic decline.  Therefore, 
any progressive legislation runs the risk of being labeled as an incarnation of “big 
government” principles, and may be opposed on economic grounds.  Thus, new 
constraints on public environmentalism are emerging and require further investigation. 
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 Second, this study treated all presidential discourse as equal and did not prioritize 
rhetoric from the most widely viewed addresses.  While the widely viewed “State of the 
Union” addresses and Obama’s “BP Oil Spill Oval Office Address” were cited as 
examples of Obama’s environmental rhetoric, several speeches with much fewer viewers 
were cited as well.  In retrospect, it may have been more effective to use a certain number 
of viewers as a constraint on the set of environmental addresses analyzed.  After 
substantial investigation, I believe that the economic and national security themes emerge 
from all of Obama’s presidential environmental rhetoric; however, other themes in less 
viewed addresses may have cluttered and confused analysis. 
 Finally, some parts of this study may act to conflate correlation with causality.  
For example, the “war on crime” metaphor was not the singular cause of the failure of 
anti-crime policy.  Rather, the rhetorical choice may have helped construct a world in 
which literal violence became more likely.  Also, national security justifications for 
environmental policy were not the only reason corn-based ethanol was widely supported, 
agricultural interest groups and lobbies surely had a large influence as well.  However, 
the national security frame may have helped construct a world in which environmental 
arguments were sidestepped in favor of alternative justifications.  While evidence 
presented throughout this study supports the likely possibility of rhetorical choices 
influencing political outcomes, some qualification is necessary. 
Directions for Future Research 
 This study has generated several questions about the relationship between 
presidential rhetoric and environmental policy that provides ample ground for future 
investigation.  First, while this study is helpful for understanding the first seventeen 
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months of Obama’s presidency, a more thorough investigation of the rhetoric of other 
environmental advocates may prove useful.  For example, rhetoric by Bono, Al Gore, and 
Bill Gates surely influences public support for governmental environmental policy.  
While this study is premised on the idea that presidential rhetoric is most influential, 
today’s widespread internet culture makes other environmental advocates equally as 
accessible. 
 Second, a recurring theme that emerged while researching is that often time’s 
environmental exigences, not presidential advocacy, motivate environmental policy.  For 
example, Silent Spring, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, and the BP Oil Spill all created a 
sense of urgency in the public that translated into progressive environmental policy.  
Further research should investigate how presidents respond to extremely visible 
environmental exigences, and normatively develop strategies for the most effective 
responses. 
 Third, while this study draws heavily from comparing Obama’s rhetorical choices 
to historically similar rhetorical constructions, the analysis of previous environmental 
presidents is limited.  Further study should focus closely to the rhetorical situations faced 
by presidents in the past, not just a brief look at the successes and failures of their 
political agenda.  In this way, a longitudinal analysis of environmental rhetoric will 
provide larger insight into the rhetorical choices made by future administrations.  
Similarly, as the Obama administration progresses into its third year, an analysis of his 
ability to rhetorically negotiate environmental policy with an increasingly conservative 
congress may prove fruitful. 
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Conclusion 
 Presidential environmental rhetoric functions to define both environmental 
problems and solutions.  This defining process creates inherent associations and 
dissociations, which works to screen out alternate definitions and representations of 
reality.  Obama’s choice to prioritize economic and national security justifications for his 
environmental policy is not unique to his administration; rather, this strategy of definition 
and association has been an approach used consistently throughout the last eighty years 
of presidential environmental rhetoric.  Empirical precedent for this definition-creating 
sustainable environmental policy is not strong.  Instead, the economic and national 
security frames have created piecemeal and half-hearted environmental policy that have 
consistently prioritized economic growth and political viability over pursuit of any 
regulation that may inhibit growth or spark a political backlash.  Obama’s inability to 
achieve environmental gains during his first seventeen months in office is surely caused 
by partisan politics, the wars abroad, unemployment and a plethora of other pressing 
concerns.  However, both the antecedent frame, and his rhetorical frame have created 
further rhetorical constraints by de-emphasizing the environment as the main concern to 
be addressed with environmental policy.  This frame poses problems for both domestic 
and international environmental policy, and needs to be abandoned or adjusted to avoid 
devastating downfalls that will only continue to produce error-prone and piecemeal 
environmental policy.  A new strategy, foregrounding environmental impact, is necessary 
if environmentalism itself is ever to achieve political salience.  In a sense, an 
environmental ethic is inevitable: either advocates will motivate policy to prevent an 
environmental collapse, or the collapse of the environment itself will produce visible 
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exigencies that motivate a reactionary response.  For the sake of the environment, 
national security, economic prosperity and public health, a successful rhetorical change 
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